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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview of Device-to-Device Communication
As one of next-generation wireless communication systems, Third Genera-
tion Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE) is committed
to provide technologies for high data rates and system capacity. Further,
LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) was defined to support new components for LTE to
meet higher communication demands [1]. Local area services are considered
as popular issues to be improved, and by reusing spectrum resources local
data rates have been increased dramatically. However, the unlicensed spec-
trum reuse may bring inconvenience for local service providers to guarantee
a stable controlled environment, e.g., ad hoc network [2], which is not in the
control of the base station (BS) or other central nodes. Hence, accessing to
the licensed spectrum has attracted much attention.
Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is a technology component for
LTE-A. The existing researches allow D2D as an underlay to the cellular
network to increase the spectral efficiency [1, 3]. In D2D communication,
user equipments (UEs) transmit data signals to each other over a direct link
using the cellular resources instead of through the BS, which differs from
femtocell [4] where users communicate with the help of small low-power
cellular base stations. D2D users communicate directly while remaining
controlled under the BS. Therefore, the potential of improving spectral uti-
lization has promoted much work in recent years [5–10], which shows that
D2D can improve system performances by reusing cellular resources. As a
result, D2D is expected to be a key feature supported by next generation
cellular networks.
Although D2D communication brings improvement in spectral efficiency
and makes large benefits on system capacity, it also causes interference to
the cellular network as a result of spectrum sharing. Thus, an efficient inter-
ference coordination must be formulated to guarantee a target performance
level of the cellular communication. There exists several work about the
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power control of D2D UEs for restricting co-channel interference [1,3,11,12].
The authors in [13] utilized MIMO transmission schemes to avoid interfer-
ence from cellular downlink to D2D receivers sharing the same resources,
which aims at guaranteeing D2D performances. Interference management
both from cellular to D2D communication and from D2D to cellular net-
works are considered in [14]. In order to further improve the gain from
intra-cell spectrum reuse, properly pairing the cellular and D2D users for
sharing the same resources has been studied [15, 16]. The authors in [16]
proposed an alternative greedy heuristic algorithm to lessen interference to
the primary cellular networks using channel state information (CSI). The
scheme is easy-operated but cannot prevent signaling overhead. In [17], the
resource allocation scheme avoids the harmful interference by tracking the
near-far interference, identifies the interfering cellular users, and makes the
uplink (UL) frequency bands efficiently used. Also, the target is to prevent
interference from cellular to D2D communication. In [18], the authors pro-
vided analysis on optimum resource allocation and power control between
the cellular and D2D connections that share the same resources for different
resource sharing modes, and evaluated the performance of the D2D underlay
system in both a single cell scenario and the Manhattan grid environment.
Then, the schemes are to further optimize the resource usage among users
sharing the same resources. Based on the aforementioned work, it indicates
that by proper resource management, D2D communication can effectively
improve the system throughput with the interference between cellular net-
works and D2D transmissions being restricted. However, the problem of al-
locating cellular resources to D2D transmissions is of great complexity. Our
works differ from all mentioned above in that we consider some schemes to
maximize the system sum rate by allowing multiple pairs share one cellular
user’s spectrum resource.
The organization of this book is as follows. The rest of Chapter 1 gives
the basic signal and interference model for D2D communication underlaying
cellular networks, and discusses performances of different communication
modes for user equipments (UEs). Finally, game theory is proposed to solve
some resource management problems of D2D underlay cellular systems. In
Chapter 2, some physical-layer techniques in D2D underlay communications
are investigated, including power control for D2D users and beamforming
for interference avoidance. Radio resource management for maximizing sys-
tem throughput is studied in Chapter 3 which includes resource allocation
algorithm, analysis and performance results of the proposed algorithm. In
Chapter 4, cross-layer optimization is the key issue. A joint scheduling and
resource allocation scheme is proposed. An example of D2D communication
improving energy efficiency is given, where an auction-based resource allo-
cation scheme is applied and battery lifetime of UEs is explicitly considered
as the optimization goal.
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1.2 Signal and Interference Model
We consider a single cell scenario as illustrated in Fig. 1.1. For simplicity,
just one cellular user (UE1) and one D2D pair (UE2 and UE3) which is in
D2D mode are located in the cell. Three users share the same radio resources
at the same time, thus co-channel interference should be considered. The
position of UE2 is fixed as long as the distance from BS to it is D. The
position of the other D2D user UE3 is described by a uniform distribution
inside a region at most L from UE2. As most traditional cellular system,
UE1 is free to be anywhere inside the cell, following a uniform distribution.
In the simulation, we update the locations of three users in each loop.
Figure 1.1: Scenario of D2D underlay communication.
According to Fig. 1.1, three communicating users are in the system. UE2
and UE3 are in D2D mode, and UE1 is cellular user. We set the maximum
distance between UE2 and UE3 is 25 meters. Actually, no more than 100
meters distance between them can be effective. The existing results only
give a possible situation. Table 1.1 gives the main simulation parameters.
The wireless propagation is modeled according to WINNER II channel
models, and D2D channel is based on office/indoor scenario while cellular
channel is based on urban macrocell scenario. Table 1.2 gives path loss
models. d is the link distance in meters, and nwalls is the amount of walls
penetrated in the link. d′BP = 4h
′
BSh
′
MSfc/c, where fc is the centre fre-
quency in Hz, c = 3.0 × 108m/s is the propagation velocity in free space,
and h′BS and h
′
MS are the effective antenna heights at the BS and the MS,
respectively. The effective antenna heights h′BS and h
′
MS are computed as
follows: h′BS = hBS − 1.0m, h′MS = hMS − 1.0m where hBS and hMS are
the actual antenna heights, and the effective environment height in urban
environments is assumed to be equal to 1.0 m. The LOS probability is given
in Table 1.3.
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Table 1.1: Main Simulation Parameters.
Parameter Value
Cellular Isolated cell,1-sector
System area User devices are distributed within
a range of 500m from the BS
Noise spectral density -174dBm/Hz
System bandwidth 5MHz
Noise figure 5dB at BS/9dB at device
Antenna gains and patterns BS:14dBi; Device: Omnidirectional 0dBi
Cluster radius 5m,10m,15m,20m,25m
Transmit power BS:46dBm;
Device: 24dBm (without power control)
Table 1.2: Path-loss Models [19].
Scenario Path loss [dB] Shadow fading [dB]
D2D (LOS) 18.7log10(d) + 46.8 3
D2D 36.8log10(d) + 43.8 4
(NLOS) +5(nwalls − 1)
Cellular 26log10(d) + 39 4 for 10m < d < dBP
(LOS) 40.0log10(d) + 13.47 6 for d
′
BP < d < 5km,
−14.0log10(h′BS) hBS = 25m,
−14.0log10(h′MS) hMS = 1.5m
Cellular (44.9 − 6.55log10(hBS)) 8 for 50m < d < 5km,
(NLOS) ·log10(d) + 34.46 hBS = 25m,
+5.83log10(hBS) hMS = 1.5m
D2D user- PL = PLb + PLtw + PLin 7
Cellular user PLb = PLB1 (dout + din)
PLtw = 14 + 15 (1− cos (θ))2
PLin = 0.5din
Table 1.3: LOS Probability [19].
Scenario LOS probability
D2D PLOS =
{
1 , d ≤ 2.5
1− 0.9
(
1− (1.24 − 0.61 log10 (d))3
)1/3
, d > 2.5
Cellular PLOS = min (18/d, 1) · (1− exp (−d/63)) + exp (−d/63)
5
Table 1.4: OFPC Parameters.
Parameter Value
Pmax 24dBm
P0 -78dBm
α 0.8
L Path loss between two UEs in a pair.
M 1
Next, we investigate D2D and cellular SINR distribution with power
control. The LTE uplink open loop fraction power control scheme (OFPC)
is given as [20]
P = min {Pmax, P0 + 10 · log10M + α · L} (1.1)
The parameters for the power control scheme are given in Table 1.4.
In this scenario, the interference between D2D and cellular users has
been taken into account due to UL resource sharing. When the distance
between D2D and co-channel cellular users is not larger than the maximum
distance of D2D communication, the interference channel can be based on
indoor/office scenario. But when co-channel interference comes from a far-
ther location, D2D channel model is not suitable. According to WINNER
II channel models, we choose indoor-to-outdoor/outdoor-to-indoor scenario
to simulate long-distance interference channel.
Table 1.2 also gives the interference channel model. PLB1 is the path
loss of urban microcell scenario (see pp.44 in [19] for parameter detail), dout
is the distance between the outdoor terminal and the point on the wall that
is nearest to the indoor terminal, din is the distance from the wall to the
indoor terminal, θ is the angle between the outdoor path and the normal of
the wall. For simplicity, we can assume θ = 0 so that dout + din = d in the
simulation.
Consider a scenario of 19 cells, each of which is shown as Fig. 1.1. For
simplicity, a model with one cellular user and one D2D pair is considered.
Update the locations of three users in each simulation loop. Moreover, co-
channel interference is taken into account. Neighbor cell interference is also
from D2D, cellular users(UL), and BS(DL). Fig. 1.2 and Fig. 1.3 give
the SINR distribution of D2D communication without power control (PC)
mechanism in downlink (DL) and uplink (UL) period, respectively.
When D2D users share cellular DL resources without PC: D2D SINR
is better when the pair is farther away from BS. Cellular (UE1) SINR is
less sensitive to the location of D2D users. UE1 SINR is better than D2D
SINR. When sharing DL resources, the interference to D2D is from BS. The
position of the pair has direct influence on the strength of the interference.
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Figure 1.2: SINR distribution of D2D underlay communication with L=25m
(DL).
−60 −40 −20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
SINR[dB]
CD
F
 
 
D=0.4R,D2D
D=0.6R,D2D
D=0.8R,D2D
D=0.4R,CEL
D=0.6R,CEL
D=0.8R,CEL
SNR,CEL(BS)
Figure 1.3: SINR distribution of D2D underlay communication with L=25m
(UL).
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Figure 1.4: SINR distribution of D2D underlay communication under PC
with L=25m (DL).
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Figure 1.5: SINR distribution of D2D underlay communication under PC
with L=25m (UL).
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Figure 1.6: SINR distribution of D2D underlay communication under PC
with L=25m, D=0.5R. CFOL: Cellular fraction open loop PC; DFIX: D2D
fixed power; DFOL: D2D fraction open loop PC.
For cellular user, the strength of interference depends not only on the posi-
tion of D2D users, but also on the position of cellular user. Since both are
randomly distributed, the position of D2D pair does not significantly affect
the results. UE transmit power is smaller than BS, thus interference from
BS can be higher than that from D2D. As a result, D2D SINR is clearly
worse than UE1.
When D2D users share cellular UL resources without PC: D2D SINR is
almost unchanged as the distance from BS to the pair changes. BS SINR is
better when D2D pair is farther away from BS. D2D SINR is better than
BS SINR. In UL resource sharing, the strength of D2D interference depends
not only on the position of D2D users, but also on the position of cellular
user. Since both are randomly distributed, the position of D2D pair does
not significantly affect the results. For BS, the interference is from D2D
users. The position of the pair has direct influence on the strength of the
interference. UE3 is 0 ∼ 25m from UE2 and UE1 is 0 ∼ 500m away from
BS, which is likely to make D2D receive power larger than BS receive power.
Fig. 1.4 and Fig. 1.5 are the SINR distribution of D2D communica-
tion under PC in DL and UL period, respectively. When D2D users share
cellular DL resources with PC: D2D SINR has decreased. UE1 SINR has
increased. When D2D users share cellular UL resources with PC: D2D SINR
has decreased. BS SINR has increased. Fig. 1.6 is the comparison of SINR
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distribution between D2D communication with and without PC. By PC,
D2D SINR has decreased about 30dB. D2D SINR with PC gives smaller
dynamic range.
OFPC scheme limits the transmit power of D2D users, which leads to
D2D SINR degradation. Because D2D transmit power drops down, the inter-
ference to cellular user and BS decreases. Due to the path loss compensation
in OFPC scheme, D2D SINR obtains a more concentrated distribution.
1.3 Mode Selection
In Device-to-Device (D2D) underlay communication system, one of the most
challenging problems is to decide whether communicating devices should use
cellular or direct communication mode. In D2D mode the data is directly
transmitted to the receiver while cellular communication mode requires the
source device transmit to the base station (BS) and then the destination de-
vice receives from the BS on downlink (DL). Here we consider three different
mode selection criteria.
1. Cellular: All devices are in cellular mode.
2. Force D2D: D2D mode is selected always for all the communicating
devices.
3. PL D2D: D2D mode is selected if any of the path losses between
source device and its serving BS, destination device and its serving
BS, is greater than the path loss between a source and a destination
in a pair.
Here, we give the results in the multi-cell scenario of D2D communi-
cation. Because it is closer to the practical applications. The single-cell
scenario is similar to this case, and will not be repeated.
Consider a scenario of 19 cells with multiple users. The total number
of users in the center cell is 104, in which 2000 users are communicating.
At first, a communicating user is distributed uniformly in the cell. Another
one follows a uniform distribution inside a region at most L from the first
user, thus a link pair is formed. Accordingly, all the users should be located
in the cell. Fig. 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10 show the SINR distribution of D2D
communication under different mode with L = 5, 15, 35, 45m, respectively.
When the distance between D2D devices is small (L=5m): FORCE, PL
criterion give the same capacity distribution, and CEL mode falls behind. As
the maximum distance between D2D devices increases to 15m: The capacity
is still better under FORCE, PL criterion, but it has decreased. PL mode
gives higher capacity than FORCE mode does. The maximum distance
between D2D devices increases to a larger value (L=35m): FORCE mode
gives a large SINR dynamic range and more than 50% users SINR is lower
10
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Figure 1.7: SINR distribution of D2D underlay communication under dif-
ferent mode with L=5m.
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Figure 1.8: SINR distribution of D2D underlay communication under dif-
ferent mode with L=15m.
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Figure 1.9: SINR distribution of D2D underlay communication under dif-
ferent mode with L=35m.
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Figure 1.10: SINR distribution of D2D underlay communication under dif-
ferent mode with L=45m.
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than that under CEL mode. PL mode is the best one. D2D devices are
away from each other at most 45m: FORCE mode gives the worst capacity
distribution. CEL and PL mode are similar.
As the maximum distance between users in a pair increases, the perfor-
mance of direct communication degrades. There exists a threshold value of
L for deciding whether to use D2D communication. PL mode is a method
to solve the problem. Choose the better channel condition from cellular and
D2D communication can obtain an optimal performance results.
1.4 Introduction to Game Theory in D2D Com-
munication
Due to the interference caused by spectrum resource sharing between D2D
and cellular users, resource management becomes a key issue to be settled.
Game theory offers a set of mathematical tools to study the complex inter-
actions among interdependent rational players and to predict their choices
of strategies [21]. In recent years, game theory has emerged as a tool for
the design of wireless communication networks. Therefore, we employ game
theory on resource scheduling and interference avoidance in D2D commu-
nication. In this section, some necessary definitions are briefly introduced,
and current researches on wireless communications based on game theory
are also mentioned. Moreover, we give an overview of game theory method
solving problems of D2D communication in this book.
The key elements of a game are the players, the actions, the payoffs
(utilities) and the information, together known as the rule of the game.
Players are the individuals making decisions, which can be denoted as a set
M = {1, 2, . . . ,M}. An action ai is a choice that player i makes. An action
profile a = {ai|i ∈ M} is a set of all players’ actions. In an auction, players
are the bidders and actions are the bids submitted by the bidders. Player
i’s utility ui(a) is a function of the action profile a, and the utility describes
how much gains the player gets from the game for each possible action
profile. In the games, a player’s utility equals his value for the action profile
vi(a) minus his payment ci(a), i.e., ui(a) = vi(a) − ci(a). An important
assumption of game theory is that all players are rational, i.e., they intend
to choose actions to maximize their utilities. A player’s information can be
characterized by an information set, which tells what kind of knowledge the
player has at the decision instances. In order to maximize their utilities, the
players would design their strategies, which are mappings from one player’s
information sets to his actions.
A reasonable prediction of a game’s outcome is an equilibrium, where
each player chooses a best strategy to maximize his utility. Among several
available equilibrium concepts, we mainly put emphasis on the Nash Equi-
librium (NE). In a static game, an NE is a strategy profile where no player
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can increase his utility by deviating unilaterally.
In the present researches, game theory including a large number of dif-
ferent game methods are used to analyze resource allocation problems, such
as power and wireless spectrum allocations in communication networks [22],
resource management in grids [23], and distributed resource coordination
in mega-scale container terminal [24]. In [22], the authors proposed a se-
quential auction for sharing the wireless resource, which is managed by a
spectrum broker that collects bids and allocates discrete resource units using
a sequential second-price auction.
A combinatorial auction model for resource management was introduced
in [23,24]. The combinatorial auction-based resource allocation mechanism
allows an agent (bidder) to place bids on combinations of resources, called
“packages”, rather than just individual resource unit. Actually, the combi-
natorial auctions (CAs) have been employed in a variety of industries for,
e.g., truckload transportation, airport arrival and departure slots, as well
as wireless communication services. The benchmark environment of auction
theory is the private value model, introduced by Vickrey (1961), in which
one bidder has a value for each package of items and the value is not related
to the private information of other bidders [25]. Much of work has not rec-
ognized that bidders care in complex ways about the items they compete.
The CAs motivate bidders to fully express their preferences, which is an
advantage in improving system efficiency and auction revenues. Up to that
point, our interest is to apply the CA game in solving arbitrary D2D links
reusing the same cellular frequency bands with the purpose of optimizing
the system capacity.
However, it exists a series of problems and challenges in CAs, such as
pricing and bidding rules, the winner determination problem (WDP) which,
as mentioned in the literature, leads to the NP-hard allocation problem.
Therefore, we focus on the evolution mechanisms named iterative combi-
natorial auctions (I-CAs) [26, 27]. In I-CAs, the bidders submit multiple
bids iteratively, and the auctioneer computes provisional allocations and
ask prices in each auction round.
In Chapter 3, we study an effective spectrum resource allocation for D2D
communication as an underlay to further improve system efficiency based on
the I-CA. The whole system consists of the BS, multiple cellular users that
receive signals from the BS, and multiple D2D pairs that communicate with
respective receivers using licensed spectrum resources. Considering that
interference minimization is a key point and multiple D2D pairs sharing the
same resources can bring large benefits on system capacity, we formulate
the problem as a reverse I-CA game. That means, the resources as the
bidders compete to obtain business, while D2D links as the goods or services
wait to be sold. By this way, the packages of D2D pairs are auctioned
off in each auction round. Furthermore, we investigate some important
properties of the proposed resource allocation mechanism such as cheat-
14
proof, convergence and price-monotonicity. We reduce the computational
complexity and apply the scheme to WINNER II channel models [19] which
contain a well-known indoor scenario. The simulation results show that the
auction algorithm leads to a good performance on the system sum rate,
and provides high system efficiency while has lower complexity than the
exhaustive search allocation.
Prior works have considered little about time-domain scheduling of D2D
communication. In Section 4.1, we study joint scheduling, power control and
channel allocation for D2D communication using a game theoretic approach.
Note that if cellular and D2D UEs are simply modeled as selfish players,
the outcome is usually inefficient, since cellular UEs do not want to share
the channels with D2D UEs. As D2D communication is an underlay to
the primary cellular networks, the concept of the Stackelberg game is well
suited for the system. The Stackelberg game is hierarchical, and has a leader
and a follower. The leader acts first, and then the follower observes the
leader’s behavior and decides his strategy. The Stackelberg game has been
employed in cooperative networks [28] and cognitive radio networks [29,30].
In our proposed Stackelberg game, the cellular UEs are viewed as leaders
and the D2D UEs are followers. We group cellular and D2D UEs into
leader-follower pairs. The leader charges some fees for the follower using
the channel. We analyze the optimal price for the leader and the optimal
power for the follower. The strategies lead to a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Then, we propose a joint scheduling and resource allocation algorithm. The
leader-follower pairs form a priority queue based on their utilities, and the
system schedules the D2D UEs according to their orders in the queue.
The booming wireless services are drawing more energy from UE batter-
ies. However, UEs are typically handheld equipments with limited battery
lifetime. Users have to constantly charge their batteries. One major advan-
tage of D2D communication is to decrease UE transmit power consumption,
and thus, extend the battery lifetime. In Section 4.2, we further explore this
issue. We consider the energy consumption of UEs includes transmission en-
ergy and circuit energy, and model the battery lifetime using the Peukerts
law [31]. We formulate the problem as maximizing the battery lifetime of
D2D UEs subject to a rate constraint. The problem is complicated to solve
directly. Thus, we consider a game-theoretic approach, where D2D UEs
are viewed as players. The players are self-interested, and they complete to
maximize their own battery lifetime. We construct the resource allocation
game and analyze the best response, Nash equilibrium and Pareto efficiency
of the game. The players may create externality when they selfishly occupy
radio resources, causing a decrease in the quality of cellular communica-
tions. Thus, we modify the game by adding pricing as penalty and propose
the resource auction. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm
has good performances in battery lifetime.
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Chapter 2
Physical-layer Techniques
The demand of high-speed data services to wireless bandwidths grows rapidly,
which has promoted various technology development. D2D has been pro-
posed to be an underlay to the cellular network aiming to improve spectrum
efficiency and system sum rate. For its potential to resource reuse and sys-
tem capacity improvement, D2D communication is considered to be a key
feature of the next generation wireless network, and attracts much atten-
tion. But it is worth noting that D2D may cause undesirable interference to
the primary cellular users due to the spectrum sharing. This chapter focuses
on some physical-layer techniques for resource management and interference
avoidance of D2D communication underlaying cellular networks.
A simple power control scheme for D2D communication is proposed in
Section 2.1, and in Section 2.2, we investigate a joint beamforming and
power control mechanism to avoid interference between cellular and D2D
links as well as maximize system throughput.
2.1 Power Control
In this section, a threshold-based power control scheme for D2D links is
proposed to improve the performance of D2D underlay systems. Both in-
terference management and power saving are considered in this scheme.
2.1.1 Power Control Scheme
Fig. 2.1 gives the radio resource sharing of D2D and cellular links. We
can see that the co-channel interference cannot be ignored. Uplink (UL)
resource reuse has better performance on D2D channel rate and operability
compared to downlink resource reuse. However, to efficiently sharing UL
spectrum resource, it is necessary to mitigate the interference from D2D
transmitter to the BS; moreover, saving power as much as possible while
satisfying a reliable level of performance for D2D users will promote the
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system efficiency.
Figure 2.1: A scenario of resource reuse between D2D and cellular links.
Fig. 2.2 shows the interference scenario of UL resource sharing. We can
see that D2D transmitter UE1 causes interference to the BS, while cellular
user UE3 causes interference to D2D receiver UE2. Existing work [1, 3, 11]
propose some power control schemes for D2D transmissions. [1] employs the
eNB to control the maximum transmit power of D2D transmitters which
achieves the purpose of limiting the co-channel interference. In [3], D2D
power is controlled by the eNB according to statistical results at the eNB.
[11] proposes a greedy sum rate maximization optimization with full CSI
assumption. However, these schemes do not consider the practical commu-
nication constraints and detailed mechanism design. The patent [32] adjusts
D2D transmit power according to HARQ feedback from the eNB to cellular
UE, which is unreliable in judging the interference status by HARQ moni-
toring.
Figure 2.2: The interference scenario of D2D and cellular links under uplink
resource sharing
The patent [33] takes the following scheme: the eNB makes measure-
ments of interference from D2D transmitter to cellular link, computes ap-
propriate backoff or boost values, and sends a power control command to
D2D transmitter. Although this scheme control the interference relatively
effectively, the quality of D2D link is not counted for the system, which
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may cause performance loss. Further, it needs centralized scheduling as the
eNB should control both D2D and cellular communication for interference
measurement, which leads to large system overhead. Based on the above,
considering both cellular and D2D link performances, this section proposes
a power control method which can be utilized with distributed scheduling
under uplink resource sharing.
The key ideas of this scheme are as follows.
1. The BS has no direct control on the D2D link but notifies an interfer-
ence margin threshold to D2D transmitter.
2. The BS feeds back the CSI of D2D transmitter UL channel (not needed
for TDD system as the CSI can be obtained by channel symmetry).
3. D2D transmit power is calculated by D2D transmitter itself with knowl-
edge of the CSI and the interference margin threshold.
4. D2D transmitter can freely decide whether to transmit according to
allowed transmit power and D2D link status.
The key benefits of the above scheme: the system satisfies D2D link qual-
ity while guarantees cellular link away from destructive interference, which
further improves system performance. In addition, the scheme has better
scalability as distributed characteristics. It could both restrain interference
and guarantee the feasibility of D2D connection.
A simplified process of signaling interactions is shown in Fig. 2.3, and
Fig. 2.4 lists the implementation process of the proposed D2D power control.
Figure 2.3: Signaling interaction of the threshold based power control
scheme.
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Figure 2.4: Implementation process of the threshold based power control
scheme.
2.1.2 Threshold Based Power Calculation
In this scheme, D2D transmitter can calculate the permitted transmit power
bound according to the obtained CSI and the interference margin threshold.
For the uplink resource sharing, we assume the minimum SINR at the BS
is required for βB , and the interference margin threshold is represented as
κ. Then, the corresponding SNR (without the co-channel interference) and
SINR at the BS are expressed as
SNRB =
PcL
−1
cBhcB
σ2
≥ κβB , (2.1)
SINRB =
PcL
−1
cBhcB
PdL
−1
dBhdB + σ
2
≥ βB , (2.2)
respectively. Here, Pc and Pd denote the transmit signal power of cellular
and D2D user, respectively. LcB and hcB represent the path-loss and the
channel gain between the BS and cellular user. LdB and hdB are the path-
loss and the channel gain between D2D transmitter and the BS. σ2 is the
AWGN noise power.
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According to (2.1), the transmit power of cellular user satisfies
Pc ≥ κβBLcBh−1cBσ2 = Pminc . (2.3)
If the transmit power of cellular user takes the minimum value Pminc , (2.2)
can be transformed into
Pmaxd = (κ− 1)LdBh−1dBσ2 ≥ Pd. (2.4)
Thus, on the premise of satisfying the interference margin κ, the maximum
transmit power of D2D is Pmaxd .
We consider that the channel gain in the practical system may be esti-
mated, then we have
Pmax
∗
d = (κ− 1)LdBσ2
(
hˆdB
)−1
. (2.5)
Moreover, we consider the received power of D2D user Pdr = P
max∗
d L
−1
dd hdd,
where Ldd and hdd are the path-loss and the channel gain between D2D
transmitter and receiver. Thus, we fine tune the transmit power as P ∗d =
Pmax
∗
d
(
hˆdd
)−1
, and we obtain
P ∗d = (κ− 1)LdBσ2
(
hˆdB
)−1 (
hˆdd
)−1
, (2.6)
where hˆdB and hˆdd are the channel gain estimation values.
For the performance of D2D links, it requires to satisfy the minimum
SINR of receiver βd, i.e.,
PdL
−1
dd hdd
PcL
−1
cd hcd + σ
2
≥ βd, (2.7)
where Lcd and hcd represent the path-loss and the channel gain between
cellular user and D2D receiver. So we have
Pd ≥ Lddh−1dd
(
PcL
−1
cd hcd + σ
2
)
βd = P
min
d . (2.8)
Here, Pmind is the minimum transmit power to guarantee the performance
of D2D links.
Next, we give some simulation results and related analysis. Power saving
and energy efficiency are two sides that been investigated. We define the
power saving as
α =
(
POLc + P
fixed
d
)
− (POLc + P ∗d )
POLc + P
fixed
d
, (2.9)
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Table 2.1: Main Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Cellular Isolated cell, 1-sector
System area User device are distributed in a
hexagonal cell with 500m radius.
Noise spectral density -174dBm/Hz
Sub-carrier bandwidth 15kHz
Noise figure 5dB at BS/9dB at device
Antenna gains and patterns BS: 14dBi
Device:Omnidirectional 0dBi
Cluster radius 150m
Minimum SINR BS: 10dB
Device: 5dB
Number of cellular users (channels) 1/1:8
Interference margin 3dB
Transmit power bound Max: 23dBm
Detecting signal power 5dBm
Channel model WINNER II
where P fixedd is the fixed transmit power of D2D users, P
OL
c is the trans-
mit power of cellular users by LTE uplink open loop fraction power control
scheme, and P ∗d is the transmit power of D2D users by the proposed power
control scheme while satisfying the constraints Pmind ≤ P ∗d ≤ 23dBm. That
is, power saving factor α represents the percentage of saving power by the
power control scheme compared to the fixed power scheme. In the simula-
tion, energy efficiency can be calculated by
η =
log2
(
1 + SINROLc
)
+ log2 (1 + SINR
∗
d)
POLc + P
∗
d
. (2.10)
Here, SINROLc and SINR
∗
d denote the SINR at the BS and D2D receiver,
respectively. The simulation parameters are listed in Table 2.1.
Fig. 2.5 and Fig. 2.6 give the percentage of power saving and the dis-
tribution of energy efficiency under statistical channel estimation, respec-
tively. The power control scheme saves about 35% power than the fixed
power 23dBm. Besides, the power control scheme statistically performs bet-
ter than fixed power case in energy efficiency, and the performance is similar
to the centralized scheme in the patent [33].
Fig. 2.7 ∼ Fig. 2.9 show the distribution of D2D, cellular and system
throughput under statistical channel estimation. Because of the D2D power
control, the throughput of D2D link is lower than that under the fixed
maximum power 23dBm, but higher than that under the centralized PC
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Figure 2.5: Power savings under statistical channel estimation with different
fixed power (UL).
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Figure 2.6: Energy efficiency under statistical channel estimation with dif-
ferent transmit power (UL).
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Figure 2.7: Throughput distribution of D2D communication under statisti-
cal channel estimation.
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Figure 2.8: Throughput distribution of cellular communication under sta-
tistical channel estimation.
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Figure 2.9: Sum throughput distribution of cellular and D2D communica-
tions under statistical channel estimation.
scheme due to the D2D link performance guarantee. The sum throughput
is also appreciable as excessive interference to cellular links is avoided.
This section has proposed a distributed threshold-based power control
scheme that guarantees the feasibility of D2D connection, and at the same
time limits cellular SINR degradation. The BS has no direct control on the
D2D link but notifies an interference margin threshold to D2D transmit-
ter, and the value can be tuned to meet corresponding SINR requirements.
Power is calculated by D2D transmitter itself, which makes the operation
flexible and convenient, improving the system efficiency.
2.2 Beamforming
Same frequency-time resources could be shared by cellular and D2D links
to enhance the system capacity, but co-channel interference exists. During
downlink (DL), D2D links receive more interference from the BS. Interfer-
ence management is necessary to optimize the system performance. On one
side, we hope to achieve a reliable level of performance for both cellular and
D2D users. On the other side, to maximize the system throughput is our
objective. In this section, we investigate a joint beamforming and power
control method to reduce the interference and further improve the system
performance.
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2.2.1 Joint Beamforming and Power Control Scheme
In this scheme, we consider a single cell scenario, and only one cellular user
and one D2D pair in the model. We assume that the BS is equipped with
multiple antennas while UEs are respectively with a single antenna. Fig.
2.10 gives the system model, where the solid lines indicate the data trans-
missions and the dotted lines indicate the interference links. Moreover, we
assume the channel responses are known by the BS, and the SINR minimum
threshold of both cellular and D2D users are set by the BS.
Figure 2.10: System model of D2D communication underlaying cellular net-
works with downlink resource sharing.
Fig. 2.11 gives an example of beamforming with two antennas equipped
at the BS. The channel response matrix can be expressed as
H =
(
h11 h12
h21 h22
)
, (2.11)
where h11, h12 are data channel responses of cellular link, and h21, h22 are
interference channel responses of D2D link. The transmitted signal at the
BS is obtained by
x =WAs. (2.12)
Here, W is beamforming matrix, A is power normalization matrix, and S is
data vector. Thus, the received signal at cellular user UE1c and D2D receiver
UE2d can be jointly written as
y = HWAs+ n. (2.13)
In this model, the BS is the control center which conduct beamforming
and power control at the same time.
The key ideas of this scheme are as follows.
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Figure 2.11: An example of beamforming with two antennas equipped at
the BS.
1. The BS carries out beamforming to avoid D2D receiving excessive
interference from the BS.
2. D2D receiver and cellular user feed back downlink CSI to the BS.
3. The BS calculates transmit power to maximize system sum rate sub-
jected to SINR threshold of both cellular and D2D links.
The key benefits of the above scheme: the system better adapts to D2D
link quality in downlink resource sharing. In general, the scheme could guar-
antee the performance of both cellular and D2D links, and could maximize
system throughput as centralized characteristics.
A simplified process of signaling interactions is shown in Fig. 2.12, and
Fig. 2.13 lists the implementation process of the proposed joint beamforming
and power control scheme.
2.2.2 Beamforming Matrix and Power Calculation
The BS calculates the beamforming matrix according to the CSI that cellular
and D2D user feedback to it. Based on the system model in subsection 2.2.1,
the received signal at cellular user and D2D receiver can be written as
yc = h
H
c W
√
PBsc + hdc
√
Pdsd + n, (2.14)
yd = hdd
√
Pdsd + h
H
d W
√
PBsc + n, (2.15)
respectively. Here, hc =
(
h11 h21
)T
is the signal channel response of
cellular user, and hd =
(
h12 h22
)T
is the interference channel response
of D2D receiver. W =
(
w1 w2
)T
is the beamforming matrix satisfying
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Figure 2.12: Signaling interaction of the joint beamforming and power con-
trol scheme.
Figure 2.13: Implementation process of the joint beamforming and power
control scheme.
WHW = 1. sc and sd represent transmit signals from the BS and D2D
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transmitter, respectively. PB and Pd denote transmit power from the BS
and D2D transmitter, respectively. n is thermal noise with variance N0. We
employ maximizing SLNR as the beamforming criterion. That is,
max
WHhch
H
c W
WHhdh
H
d W +
N0
PB
. (2.16)
Thus, the beamforming matrix can be obtained by
W =
1
ρ
(
HHH +
N0
PB
I
)−1
hc, (2.17)
where H =
(
hc hd
)
is the channel response from the BS to users, and
ρ =
∥∥∥∥(HHH + N0PB I
)−1
hc
∥∥∥∥ is a normalization factor so that WHW = 1.
In this scheme, our objective is to maximize the system sum rate which
is expressed as
R = log2(1 + SINRc) + log2(1 + SINRd). (2.18)
In addition, the D2D transmit power Pd also need to satisfy the SINR thresh-
old of both cellular and D2D links, i.e.,
SINRc =
PB
∥∥hHc W∥∥2
Pdh
2
dc +N0
≥ βc, (2.19)
SINRd =
Pdh
2
dd
PB
∥∥hHd W∥∥2 +N0 ≥ βd, (2.20)
where βc and βd are the SINR minimum threshold of cellular user and D2D
receiver, respectively. Thus, we can summarize the objective function as
max R =log2
(
1 +
PB
∥∥hHc W∥∥2
Pdh
2
dc +N0
)
+log2
(
1 +
Pdh
2
dd
PB
∥∥hHd W∥∥2 +N0
)
, (2.21)
subject to(
PB
∥∥hHd W∥∥2+N0) βdh−2dd ≤Pd≤min((PB ∥∥hHc W∥∥2 β−1c −N0)h−2dc , Pmax) ,
(2.22)
where Pmax is the maximum transmit power that UE supports.
Next, we give some simulation results and related analysis. Through-
puts of cellular, D2D users and the whole system are our main performance
metrics. And we compare some different interference management schemes
on the system performance, including:
1. Proposed PC & BF: joint beamforming and power control;
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Table 2.2: Main Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Cellular Isolated cell, 1-sector
System area User devices are distributed in a
hexagonal cell with 600m radius.
Noise spectral density -174dBm/Hz
System bandwidth 20MHz
Sub-carrier bandwidth 15kHz
Sub-carrier number of each user 64
Cluster radius (D2D user scattering) 50m
Minimum SINR 5dB (both cellular and D2D)
Number of cellular users (channels) 1
Number of D2D pairs 1/1:4
Device transmit power upper bound 23dBm
BS total transmit power 46dBm
Channel Model WINNER II
2. No PC & BF: only beamforming is applied, and power is fixed;
3. PC & no BF: only power control is applied;
4. No PC & no BF: neither power control nor beamforming is applied.
The simulation parameters are listed in Table 2.2.
Fig. 2.14 shows the system throughput distribution with different schemes.
Obviously, joint beamforming and power control scheme makes the whole
system performance better. Fig. 2.15 and Fig. 2.16 give the throughput
distribution of D2D and cellular user. On one side, beamforming makes the
performance of D2D communication better as SLNR criteria constrains the
interference from the BS to D2D receiver. On the other side, power con-
trol makes the performance of cellular communication better as it limits the
interference from D2D to cellular user.
For multiple D2D pairs, we consider the objective function the same
as that of single pair for simplicity. Fig. 2.17 is the result of the system
throughput with different number of D2D pairs. We can see that the pro-
posed scheme gives the optimal performance.
Fig. 2.18 gives the system throughput with different cellular radius.
When the radius is small, beamforming prevents interference from BS to
D2D effectively which makes the performance gain obvious. When the radius
increases, the received signal power of cellular user decreases. Thus, power
control becomes more important to prevent interference from D2D.
Fig. 2.19 shows the throughput of D2D user with different cellular ra-
dius. We find that power control does not bring strong fading to D2D
29
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
sum throughput [bit/(s*Hz)]
cd
f
 
 
proposed PC & BF
no PC & BF
PC & no BF
no PC & no BF
Figure 2.14: System throughput distribution with different interference man-
agement schemes.
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Figure 2.15: Throughput distribution of D2D communication with different
interference management schemes.
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Figure 2.16: Throughput distribution of cellular communication with differ-
ent interference management schemes.
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Figure 2.17: System throughput with different number of D2D pairs.
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Figure 2.18: System throughput with different cellular radius.
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Figure 2.19: Throughput of D2D communication with different cellular ra-
dius.
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communication. In fact, power control includes the mechanism that guar-
antees SINR of D2D being above the threshold, and the objective function of
power control is the system throughput. We focus on the top two lines, and
find the gap between the proposed scheme and the other one is comparably
obvious when the cellular radius is small. Because cellular communication
is dominant when the radius is small, system throughput would get profit
from D2D power reducing. Thus, fading of D2D link becomes obvious.
This section has proposed a joint beamforming and power control scheme
that aims to maximize the system sum rate while guarantees the perfor-
mance of both cellular and D2D connections. The BS sets SINR threshold
for D2D and cellular links, and the value can be tuned to meet correspond-
ing performance requirements. The BS carries out beamforming to avoid
D2D from excessive interference. D2D transmit power is calculated by the
BS based on maximizing the system sum rate. Also, the BS decides whether
the calculated D2D transmit power available according to SINR threshold
of cellular and D2D links.
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Chapter 3
Radio Resource Management
An innovative resource allocation scheme is proposed to improve the perfor-
mance of mobile peer-to-peer, i.e., device-to-device (D2D), communications
as an underlay in the downlink (DL) cellular networks. To optimize the sys-
tem sum rate over the resource sharing of both D2D and cellular modes, we
introduce a reverse iterative combinatorial auction as the allocation mech-
anism. In the auction, all the spectrum resources are considered as a set
of resource units, which as bidders compete to obtain business while the
packages of the D2D pairs are auctioned off as goods in each auction round.
We first formulate the valuation of each resource unit, as a basis of the pro-
posed auction. And then a detailed non-monotonic descending price auction
algorithm is explained depending on the utility function that accounts for
the channel gain from D2D and the costs for the system. Further, we prove
that the proposed auction-based scheme is cheat-proof, and converges in a
finite number of iteration rounds. We explain non-monotonicity in the price
update process and show lower complexity compared to a traditional combi-
natorial allocation. The simulation results demonstrate that the algorithm
efficiently leads to a good performance on the system sum rate.
3.1 Basics of Model and Auction Mechanism
In this section, we introduce the system model for D2D underlay commu-
nication. The scenario of multiple D2D and cellular users is first described,
and then, the expression of system sum rate is given.
1) Scenario Description
A model of a single cell with multiple users is considered. As shown in
Fig. 3.1, UEs with data signals between each other are in the D2D commu-
nication mode while UEs that transmit data signals with the BS keep in the
traditional cellular mode. Each user is equipped with a single omnidirec-
tional antenna. The locations of cellular users and D2D pairs are randomly
set and traversing the whole cell. Without loss of generality, we employ
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Figure 3.1: System model of D2D communication underlaying cellular net-
works with downlink resource sharing.
the uniform distribution to describe the user locations which is proposed for
system simulation in [34]. Notice that from stochastic geometry with for
Poisson distributions, the users are uniformly located as well if the number
of users is known [35]. For simplicity and clarity, we illustrate co-channel
interference scenario involving three UEs (UEc, UEd,1 and UEd,2), and omit
the interference and control signal signs among others. UEc is a traditional
cellular user that is distributed uniformly in the cell. UEd,1 and UEd,2 are
close enough to satisfy the distance constraints of D2D communication, and
at the same time they also have communicating demands. One member of
the D2D pair UEd,1 is distributed uniformly in the cell, and the position of
the other member UEd,2 follows a uniform distribution inside a region at
most L from UEd,1.
The existing researches [17, 18] confirm that with power control or re-
source scheduling mechanism, the inter-cell interference can be managed
efficiently. Therefore, we place an emphasis on the intra-cell interference,
which is due to resource sharing of D2D and cellular communication. Gener-
ally speaking, the session setup of D2D communication requires the following
steps [1]:
1. A request of communicating is initiated by one UE pair.
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2. The system detects traffic originating from and destined to the UE in
the same subnet.
3. If the traffic fulfills a certain criterion (e.g., data rate), the system
considers the traffic as potential D2D traffic.
4. The BS checks if D2D communication offers higher throughput.
5. If both UEs are D2D capable and D2D mode offers higher throughput,
the BS may set up a D2D bearer.
The cross-layer processes of resource control can be contained in the above
steps, and be generally summarized as: the transmitters (both cellular and
D2D users) send detecting signals. Then CSI would be obtained by corre-
sponding receivers and be feedback to the control center (e.g. the BS). The
power control and spectrum allocation are conducted based on certain prin-
ciples. Finally, the BS sends control signals to users according to allocation
results.
Even if the D2D connection setup is successful, the BS still maintain
detecting if UE should be back to the cellular communication mode. Fur-
thermore, the BS maintains the radio resource control for both cellular and
D2D communication. Based on these communication features, we mainly
focus on assigning cellular resources to D2D communication.
Here, we consider a scenario of sharing downlink (DL) resource of the
cellular network as shown in Fig. 3.1. We assume UEd,1 is the transmitter
of the D2D pair sharing the same sub-channel with the BS, and thus, UEd,2
as the D2D receiver receives interference from the BS. Also, the cellular
receiver UEc is exposed to interference from UEd,1. In addition, the D2D
users feed back the CSI to the BS, whereas the BS transmits control signals
to the D2D pair, in the way that the system achieves D2D power control
and resource allocation.
During the DL period of the cellular system, both cellular and D2D users
receive interference as they share the same sub-channels. Here, we assume
that any cellular user’s resource blocks (RBs) can be shared with multiple
D2D pairs and each pair can use more than one user’s RBs for transmitting.
We assume the numbers of cellular users and D2D pairs in the model are
C and D, respectively. During the DL period, the BS transmits signal xc
to the c-th (c = 1, 2, ..., C) cellular user, and the d-th (d = 1, 2, ...,D) D2D
pair uses the same spectrum resources transmitting signal xd. The received
signals at UE c and D2D receiver d are written as
yc =
√
PBhBcxc +
∑
d
βcd
√
Pdhdcxd + nc, (3.1)
yd=
√
Pdhddxd +
√
PBhBdxc+
∑
d′
βdd′
√
Pd′hd′dxd′+ nd, (3.2)
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where PB , Pd and Pd′ are the transmit power of BS, D2D transmitter d,
d′, respectively. hij is the channel response of the i − j link that is from
equipments i to j. nc and nd are the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
at the receivers with one-sided power spectral density (PSD) N0. βcd repre-
sents the presence of interference satisfying βcd = 1 when RBs of UE c are
assigned to UE d, otherwise βcd = 0. As a cellular user can share resources
with multiple D2D pairs, it also satisfies 0 ≤ ∑d βcd ≤ D. Similarly, βdd′
represents the presence of interference between D2D pairs d and d′.
The channel is modeled as the Rayleigh fading channel, and thus, the
channel response follows the independent identical complex Gaussian dis-
tribution. In addition, the free space propagation path-loss model, P =
P0 · (d/d0)−α, is used where P0 and P represent signal power measured at d0
and d away from the transmitter, respectively. α is the path-loss exponent.
Hence, the received power of each link can be expressed as
Pr,ij = Pi · h2ij = Pi · (dij)−α · h20, (3.3)
where Pr,ij and dij are the received power and the distance of the i− j link,
respectively. Pi represents the transmit power of equipment i and h0 is the
complex Gaussian channel coefficient that obeys the distribution CN (0, 1).
And we simplify the received power at d0 = 1 equals the transmit power.
2) System Sum Rate
For the purpose of maximizing the network capacity, the signal to in-
terference plus noise ratio (SINR) should be considered as an important
indicator. The SINR of user j is
γj =
Pih
2
ij
Pint,j +N0
, (3.4)
where Pint,j denotes the interference signal power received by user j, and N0
accounts for the terminal noise at the receiver.
Determined by the Shannon capacity formula, we can calculate the chan-
nel rate corresponding to the SINR of cellular and D2D users. As cellular
users suffer interference from D2D communicating that sharing the same
spectrum resource, the interference power of cellular user c is
Pint,c =
∑
d
βcdPdh
2
dc. (3.5)
While the interference of D2D receiver d is from both BS and D2D users
that are assigned the same resources to, the interference power of user d can
be expressed as
Pint,d = PBh
2
Bd +
∑
d′
βdd′Pd′h
2
d′d. (3.6)
Based on (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6), we can obtain the channel rate of cellular
user c and D2D receiver d as
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Rc = log2

1 + PBh2Bc∑
d
βcdPdh
2
dc +N0

 , (3.7)
Rd = log2

1 + Pdh2dd
PBh2Bd +
∑
d′
βdd′Pd′h
2
d′d +N0

 , (3.8)
respectively. Here, d 6= d′. So∑
d′
βdd′Pd′h
2
d′d represents the interference from
the other D2D pairs that share spectrum resources with pair d.
The DL system sum rate can be defined as
ℜ =
C∑
c=1
(
Rc +
D∑
d=1
βcdRd
)
. (3.9)
In the next subsection, we formulate the problem of designing βcd for each
D2D pair as an optimization issue of maximizing ℜ.
In this subsection, we introduce two concepts: valuation model and util-
ity function, which are bases of the auction mechanism. Also, some defini-
tions are given.
3) Valuation Model
As D2D communication shares the same spectrum resources with cellular
communication at the same time slot, the co-channel interference should
be limited as much as possible to optimize the system performance. The
radio signals experience different degrees of fading, and thus, the amount of
interference depends on transmit power and spatial distances. Accordingly,
we focus on assigning appropriate resource blocks (RBs) occupied by cellular
users to D2D pairs in order to minimize interference to achieve a higher
system sum rate. Next, we formulate the relation between the allocation
result and the rate of the shared channel. The relation can be defined as a
value function whose target value is the channel rate.
We define D as a package of variables representing the index of D2D
pairs that share the same resources. We assume the total pairs can form N
such packages. Thus, if the members of the k-th (k = 1, 2, ..., N) D2D user
package share resources with cellular user c, the channel rates of UE c and
D2D pair d (d ∈ Dk) can be written as
Rkc = log2

1 + PBh2Bc∑
d∈Dk
Pdh
2
dc +N0

 , (3.10)
Rkd = log2

1 + Pdh2dd
PBh2Bd +
∑
d′∈Dk−{d}
Pd′h
2
d′d +N0

 , (3.11)
respectively. The rate of the operating channel shared by UE c and D2D
pairs d ∈ Dk is
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Rck = R
k
c +
∑
d∈Dk
Rkd. (3.12)
According to (3.10) ∼ (3.12), when assigning resources of UE c to the
k-th package of D2D pairs, the channel rate is given by
Vc(k)= log2

1 + PBh2Bc∑
d∈Dk
Pdh
2
dc +N0


+
∑
d∈Dk
log2

1+ Pdh2dd
PBh2Bd+
∑
d′∈Dk−{d}
Pd′h
2
d′d+N0

. (3.13)
In the proposed reverse I-CA mechanism, we consider spectrum resources
occupied by cellular user c as one of the bidders who submit bids to compete
for the packages of D2D pairs, in order to maximize the channel rate. It is
obvious that there would be a gain of channel rate owing to D2D communi-
cating as long as the contribution to data signals from D2D is larger than
that to interference signals. Considering the constraint of a positive value,
we define the performance gain as
vc(k) = max (Vc(k)− Vc, 0) , (3.14)
which is the private valuation of bidder c for the package of D2D pairs Dk.
Here, Vc denotes the channel rate of UE c without co-channel interference
and is obtained by
Vc = log2
(
1 +
PBh
2
Bc
N0
)
. (3.15)
Thus, we have the following definition:
Definition 1 A valuation model V = {vc (k)} is a set of the private
valuations of all bidders c ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C} for all packages Dk ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,D}
(k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}).
4) Utility Function
In the auction, the cellular resource denoted by c obtains a gain by
getting a package of D2D communications. However, there exists some cost
such as control signals transmission and information feedback during the
access process. We define the cost as a pay price.
Definition 2 The price to be payed by the bidder c for the package Dk is
called pay price denoted by Pc(k). The unit price of item d (∀k, d ∈ Dk)
can be denoted by pc(d).
Here, we consider linear anonymous prices [26], which means the prices
are linear if the price of a package is equal to the sum of the prices of its
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items, and the prices are anonymous if the prices of the same package for
different bidders are equal. Thus, we have
Pc(k) =
∑
d∈Dk
pc (d) =
∑
d∈Dk
p (d),∀c = 1, 2, . . . , C. (3.16)
Therefore, the payment of a bidder is determined by the unit price p(d) and
the size of bidding package Dk.
Definition 3 Bidder utility, or named bidder payoff Uc(k) expresses
satisfaction of bidder c getting package Dk. The bidder utility can be defined
as Uc(k) = vc (k)− Pc(k). (3.17)
Based on (3.14), (3.16), (3.17), Vc(k) in (3.13) and Vc in (3.15), we can
obtain the utility of bidder c as
Uc(k) = log2

1 + PBh2Bc∑
d∈Dk
Pdh
2
dc +N0


+
∑
d∈Dk
log2

1 + Pdh2dd
PBh2Bd +
∑
d′∈Dk−{d}
Pd′h
2
d′d +N0


− log2
(
1 +
PBh
2
Bc
N0
)
−
∑
d∈Dk
p (d). (3.18)
In order to describe the allocation outcome intuitively, we give the defi-
nition below.
Definition 4 The result of the auction is a spectrum allocation denoted
by X = (X1,X2, . . . ,XC), which allocates a corresponding package to each
bidder. And the allocated packages may not intersect (∀i, j, Xi ∩Xj = ∅).
We consider a set of binary variables {xc(k)} to redefine the allocation
as
xc (k) =
{
1, if Xc = Dk,
0, otherwise.
(3.19)
According to the literature, two most popular bidding languages are exclusive-
OR (XOR), which allows a bidder to submit multiple bids but at most one
of the bids can win, and additive-OR (OR), which allows one to submit
multiple bids and any non-intersecting combination of the bids can win. We
consider the XOR bidding language. Thus, (3.19) satisfies
∑N
k=1 xc (k) ≤ 1
and
∑N
k=1 xc (k) = 0 ⇒ Xc = ∅ for ∀c = 1, 2, . . . , C. If given an alloca-
tion X , the total bidder utility of all bidders can be denoted as Uall(X ) =∑C
c=1
∑N
k=1 xc(k)Uc(k). Furthermore, the auctioneer revenue is denoted as
A(X ) =∑Cc=1∑Nk=1 xc(k)Pc(k), which is usually considered to be the auc-
tioneer’s gain.
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3.2 Resource Allocation Algorithm Based on Re-
verse Iterative Combinatorial Auction
In this section, we formulate the resource allocation for D2D communication
as a reverse I-CA game. First, we introduce some concepts of the I-CA
games. Then, we investigate details of the allocation process.
1) Reverse Iterative Combinatorial Auction Game
As mentioned before, we assume the total spectrum resources are divided
into C units with each one already providing communication service to one
cellular user. By the auction game, the spectrum units are assigned to
N user packages {D1,D2, ...,DN}, with each package consisting of at least
one D2D pair. In other words, the spectrum units compete to obtain D2D
communication for improving the channel rate.
During an I-CA game, the auctioneer announces an initial price for each
item, and then, the bidders submit to the auctioneer their bids at the current
price. As long as the demand exceeds the supply, or on the contrary that
the supply exceeds the demand, the auctioneer updates (raises or reduces)
the corresponding price and the auction goes to the next round.
Obviously, it can be shown that the overall gain, which includes the total
gain of the auctioneer and all bidders does not depend on the pay price, but
equals to the sum of the allocated packages’ valuations, i.e.,
A (X ) + Uall (X )
=
C∑
c=1
N∑
k=1
xc (k)Pc (k) +
C∑
c=1
N∑
k=1
xc (k)Uc (k)
=
C∑
c=1
N∑
k=1
xc (k)Pc (k) +
C∑
c=1
N∑
k=1
xc (k) [(vc (k)− Pc (k))]
=
C∑
c=1
N∑
k=1
xc (k) vc (k). (3.20)
As our original intention, we employ the I-CA to obtain an efficient allocation
for spectrum resources.
Definition 5 An efficient allocation denoted by X˜ = (X˜1, X˜2, . . . , X˜C) =
{x˜c(k)} is an allocation that maximizes the overall gain.
Given the private bidder valuations for all possible packages in (3.14), an
efficient allocation can be obtained by solving the combinatorial allocation
problem (CAP).
Definition 6 The Combinatorial Allocation Problem (CAP), also
sometimes referred as Winner Determination Problem (WDP), leads
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to an efficient allocation by maximizing the overall gain: max
Dk=Xc∈X∈X
∑C
c=1vc(k),
where X denotes the set of all possible allocations.
An integer linear program using the binary decision variables {xc(k)} is
formulated for the CAP as
max
C∑
c=1
N∑
k=1
xc (k) vc (k), (3.21)
s.t.
N∑
k=1
xc(k) ≤ 1,∀c ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C} ,
∑
Dk:d∈Dk
C∑
c=1
xc(k) ≤ 1,∀d ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,D} .
The objective function maximizes the overall gain, and the constraints guar-
antee: 1) at most one package can be allocated to each bidder; 2) each item
cannot be sold more than once.
In fact, there might be multiple optimal solutions of the CAP with the
same objective function. From the auctioneer’s point of view, tie-breaking
rules are needed to determine which of the optimal solutions is selected.
In a real auction, the auctioneer does not know the private valuations of
the bidders, neither can it solve the NP-hard problem. To solve the CAP,
the auctioneer selects the winners on the basis of the submitted bids in
each round. Therefore, in case of the XOR bidding language, the WDP
formulation is similar to the CAP and the only difference is the objective
function
max
C∑
c=1
N∑
k=1
xc (k)Ptc (k), (3.22)
where Ptc(k) represents the pay price of bidder c for package Dk in round t.
Based on Definition 5, the overcome of a CA is not always efficient.
Here, we employ allocating efficiency as a primary measure to benchmark
auctions.
Definition 7 Allocating efficiency in CAs can be expressed as the ratio
of the overall gain of the final allocation to that of an efficient allocation [26]
E(X ) = A (X ) + Uall (X )
A
(
X˜
)
+ Uall
(
X˜
) , (3.23)
which has E(X ) ∈ [0, 1].
2) Algorithm for Resource Allocation
In this subsection, the details of the allocation scheme based on reverse
I-CA are introduced. We has modeled the D2D resource allocation problem
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as a reverse I-CA game and gave the valuation model, utility function and
other important concepts. Many I-CA designs, especially for the centralized
I-CA design, are based on ask prices. The price-based I-CA designs differ by
the pricing scheme and price update rules. In the proposed algorithm, linear
prices are used as mentioned in Section 3.1 for they are easy to understand
for bidders and convenient to communicate in each auction round. Because
of the interference from D2D links, cellular channels should guarantee the
performance of cellular system before allowing the D2D access. Hence, we
consider a descending price criterion in the algorithm. Prices update by a
greedy mode that once a bidder submits a bid for items or packages the
corresponding prices are fixed, otherwise the prices are decreased.
At the beginning of the allocation, the BS collects the location informa-
tion of all the D2D pairs. In addition, the round index t = 0, the initial
ask price p0(d) for each item (D2D pair) d, and the fixed price reduction
∆ > 0 are set up. When the initial prices are announced to all the bidders
(i.e. spectrum resources occupied by cellular UEs), each bidder submits
bids, which consist of its desired packages and the corresponding pay prices.
Jump bidding where bidders are allowed to bid higher than the prices, is
not allowed in our scheme, thus bidders always bid at the current prices.
According to the CAP proposed in Definition 6 and the analysis about the
WDP, we simplify the problem of maximizing the overall gain as a process
of collecting the highest pay price. As a result, bidder c bids for package Dk
as long as Uc(k) ≥ 0. Combining (3.16) and (3.17), we have
vc (k) ≥ Ptc (k) =
∑
d∈Dk
pt (d), (3.24)
where the round index t ≥ 0. In this case, let btc(k) =
{Dk,Ptc(k)} denote
the submitted bid at the end of round t, and Bt = {btc(k)} denotes all the
bids. When (3.24) is not satisfied, bid btc(k) = {∅, 0}. If ∃d ∈ Dk satisfies
∀btc(k) ∈ Bt,Dk /∈ btc(k), it reveals that the supply exceeds the demand.
Then, the BS sets t = t+1, pt+1(d) = pt(d)−∆ where d is the over-supplied
item, and the auction moves on to the next round.
In a normal case, as long as the price of a package decreases below a
bidder’s valuation for that package, the bidder submits a bid for it. The
BS allocates the package to the bidder, and fixes the corresponding prices
of items. At the same time, constrained by the XOR bidding language,
the bidder is not allowed to participate the following auction rounds. As
the asking prices decrease discretely every round, it may exist a situation
that more than one bidders bid for packages containing the same items
simultaneously. The BS detects the bids of all the bidders: 1) it exists
btc1(k) = b
t
c2(k) 6= {∅, 0} (c1 6= c2, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}); 2) it exists btc1(k1) ={Dk1 ,Ptc1(k1)}, btc2(k2) = {Dk2 ,Ptc2(k2)} (k1 6= k2, c1, c2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C})
satisfying Dk1 ∩ Dk2 6= ∅. If either of the above conditions is satisfied, the
overall demand exceeds supply for at least one item. Then, the BS sets a
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Table 3.1: The resource allocation algorithm
∗ Initial State:
The BS collects the location information of all D2D pairs.
The valuation of the c-th resource unit for package k is
vc(k), c = 1, 2, . . . , C, k = 1, 2, . . . , N , which is given by
(3.14). The round index t = 0, and the initial price P 0(d),
the fixed price reduction ∆ > 0 are set up.
∗ Resource Allocation Algorithm:
1. Bidder c submits bids {Dk,Pc(k)} depending on its util-
ity.
⋆ bidder c bids for package Dk as long as Uc(k) ≥ 0, which
is represented by (3.24).
⋆ If Uc(k) < 0, bidder c submits {∅, 0}.
2. If ∃d ∈ Dk satisfies ∀btc(k) ∈ Bt,Dk /∈ btc(k), the BS sets
t = t+ 1, pt+1(d) = pt(d) −∆ where d is the over-supplied
item, and the auction moves on to the next round. Return
to step 1.
3. The BS detects the bids of all the bidders:
1) it exists btc1(k) = b
t
c2(k) 6= {∅, 0} (c1 6= c2, k ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N});
2) it exists btc1(k1) =
{Dk1 ,Ptc1(k1)}, btc2(k2) ={Dk2 ,Ptc2(k2)} (k1 6= k2, c1, c2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C}) satisfying
Dk1 ∩ Dk2 6= ∅.
4. If neither of the conditions in step 3 is satisfied, go to
step 5. Otherwise, the overall demand exceeds supply for at
least one item. The BS sets pt(d) = pt(d) + δ, and δ can be
set by δ = ∆/i where i is an integer factor. Return to step
1.
5. The allocation can be determined by repeating the above
steps. The auction continues until all D2D links are auc-
tioned off or every cellular channel wins a package.
fine tuning pt(d) = pt(d) + δ where d is the temporary over-demanded item,
and δ can be set by δ = ∆/i where i is an integer factor that affects the
convergence rate. The allocation can be determined by multiple iterations.
The auction continues until all the D2D links are auctioned off or every
channel wins a package. Our algorithm is detailed in Table 3.1.
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3.3 Analysis of the Auction-Based Resource Allo-
cation Algorithm
In this section, we investigate the important properties of the proposed
auction-based resource allocation mechanism.
1) Cheat-Proof
As the general definition, cheat-proof means that reporting the true de-
mand in each auction round is a best response for each bidder.
Proposition 1 The resource allocation algorithm based on the reverse I-CA
is cheat-proof.
Proof 1 From (3.18), we can get that the utility of bidder Uc(k) depends on
the valuation of the package it bids and unit prices of the items. In details, it
is the interference (between cellular and D2D communications) that mainly
affects the utility. As the expression is extremely complex to resolve, we
consider the case that only one item constitutes the package without loss of
generality. The utility of bidder c can be rewritten as
Uc(d) = log2
(
1 +
PBh
2
Bc
Pdh
2
dc +N0
)
+ log2
(
1 +
Pdh
2
dd
PBh
2
Bd +N0
)
− log2
(
1 +
PBh
2
Bc
N0
)
− pt (d) , (3.25)
and the differential expressions of the utility with respect to hdc and hBd are
∂Uc (d)
∂hdc
=
−2PdhdcPBh2Bc
ln 2
(
Pdh
2
dc+PBh
2
Bc+N0
) (
Pdh
2
dc+N0
) < 0, (3.26)
∂Uc (d)
∂hBd
=
−2PBhBdPdh2dd
ln 2
(
PBh2Bd+Pdh
2
dd+N0
) (
PBh2Bd+N0
) < 0, (3.27)
respectively. Accordingly, utility Uc(d) is a monotonically decreasing function
with respect to both hdc and hBd. Thus, the optimal strategy is to bid the
D2D link that has a lower channel gain with the cellular transmitter and
receiver.
In a descending price auction, items are always too expensive to afford at
the beginning. With the number of iterations t increasing, the prices of items
drop off. Given a package Dk in round t, bidder c has the right to submit
bid
{Dk,Ptc(k)} or {∅, 0}. Given that all the other bidders submit their true
demands according to (3.24), we consider the strategy of bidder c in two
cases: 1) if c bids {∅, 0} when its true valuation for Dk satisfies Uc(k) ≥ 0,
it will quit this round and lose the package which maximizes its channel rate;
2) if c bids
{Dk,Ptc(k)} when its true valuation for Dk satisfies Uc(k) < 0
and finally wins the package, it will obviously get a negative surplus that is
unwanted.
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From the above analysis, we can conclude that the optimal strategy for
cellular channel c is to submit its true demand in each round, or it will get a
loss in its utility as a result of any deceiving. That is, the proposed resource
allocation algorithm is cheat-proof.
2) Convergence
In this subsection, we prove that the proposed algorithm has the con-
vergence property.
Proposition 2 The resource allocation algorithm based on the reverse I-CA
has the convergence property that the number of the iterations is finite.
Proof 2 According to Theorem 1, all the bidders submit their true demands
in each auction round, in order to obtain the utility from winning. From
(3.18), we can derive U t+1c − U tc = ∆ > 0, (3.28)
where U tc denotes the utility of bidder c in round t. According to the al-
gorithm, we have that bidder c will get zero utility with no bid if U tc < 0,
and have an opportunity to win a positive utility with bid
{Dk,Ptc(k)} if
U tc ≥ 0. Therefore, in the beginning, bidder c plays a waiting game, and
once U tc(k) ≥ 0, it will bid for Dk. As long as it is the only one that submits
a bid, it will get the package. With a sufficiently large t and ∆ > 0, we can
finally get xc(k) = 1. Similarly, if more than one bidders bid for the same
item, we can have an allocation by ascending price process with the step
δ < ∆. Subjected to
∑
Dk:d∈Dk
C∑
c=1
xc(k) ≤ 1 in (3.21), the package can not be
sold once more. Thus, for a finite number of packages N , the number of
iterations is finite. That is, the proposed scheme would reach convergence.
In addition, the value of the price step ∆ has a direct impact on the
speed of convergence of the proposed scheme. The scheme converges fast
when ∆ is large, while it converges slowly when ∆ is small. The fine tuning
δ also has the same nature, but less impact on convergence.
3) Price Monotonicity
In an I-CA game, the price updates through several ways, i.e., mono-
tonically increasing, monotonically decreasing and non-monotonic modes.
Here, we focus on the price non-monotonicity in the proposed reverse I-CA
algorithm.
Proposition 3 In the proposed descending price auction, the raising item
prices in a round may be necessary to reflect the competitive situation. More-
over, it brings efficiency improvement.
Proof 3 From the algorithm proposed in Table 3.1, there exists a situation
that more than one bidders submit bids for the same package or different
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packages with intersection when prices are reduced to some certain values.
But auctions do not allow one item being obtained by multiple bidders as
the second constraint in (3.21) shows. In this situation, raising the corre-
sponding prices by a fine tuning δ = ∆/i makes bidders to reinspect their
utility functions. Once a bidder finds its utility less than zero, it quits from
the competition. By a finite number of iterations, the winner converges to
one bidder. Since the ascending price process maximizes the auctioneer rev-
enue as shown in (3.22), the allocation has higher efficiency than a random
allocation in that situation.
4) Complexity
As mentioned before, a traditional CAP in fact is an NP-hard problem,
the normal solution of which is the centralized exhaustive search. We set
that the number of items to be allocated is m, and the number of bidders
is n. For an exhaustive optimal algorithm, an item can be allocated with
n possible results. Thus, all the m items are allocated with nm possible
results. The complexity of the algorithm can be denoted by O(nm). In the
proposed reverse I-CA scheme, bidders reveal their entire utility function,
i.e., they calculate valuations for all possible packages, the number of which
is C1m + C2m + · · · + Cmm = 2m − 1. If the total number of iterations is t,
the complexity of the auction-based scheme is O(n (2m − 1) + t). From the
proposed algorithm, we have pt (d) = p0 (d)−∆ · t ≥ 0 (The fine tuning has
a small impact on the result and can be omitted here). So the worst case is
t = p0 (d)
/
∆. It is obvious that for sufficient large values ofm and n, general
values of p0(d) and ∆, a much lower complexity is obtained by using the
proposed reverse I-CA scheme. That is, O(nm) > O(n (2m − 1)+p0 (d)/∆).
If we constrain the number of D2D pairs sharing the same channel to one,
the complexity would be further reduced to O(n ·m + p0 (d)/∆). And the
performance of this reduced scheme is included in the simulation in Section
3.4.
5) Overhead
In D2D underlay system, the BS is still the control center of resource
allocation, and the global CSI should indeed be available at the BS for the
proposed scheme. In addition to the CSI detection, feedback, and the control
signaling transmission, the reverse I-CA scheme does not need additional
signaling overhead compared to existing resource scheduling schemes such
as maximum carrier to interference (Max C/I) and proportional fair (PF),
which also need the global CSI to optimize the system performance. The
difference is that the reverse I-CA scheme requires more complicated CSI
due to the interference between D2D and cellular network.
At the beginning of the allocation, the transmitters need to send some
packets containing detection signals. Then, the obtained CSI at each ter-
minal (D2D or cellular receiver) would be feedback to the BS. After that,
iteration process would be conducted at the BS, and no signaling needs to
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Table 3.2: Main Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Cellular layout Isolated cell, 1-sector
System area The radius of the cell is 500 m
Noise spectral density -174 dBm/Hz
Sub-carrier bandwidth 15 kHz
Noise figure 9 dB at device
Antenna gains BS: 14 dBi; Device: 0 dBi
The maximum distance of D2D 5 m
Transmit power BS: 46 dBm; Device: 23 dBm
be exchanged among the network nodes until the control signals forwarding.
Methods, such as CSI feedback compression and signal flooding, would
help reduce the overhead. In addition, the future work on D2D communi-
cation could consider some mechanism that limit the number of D2D pairs
sharing the same channel by, e.g. distance constraint, which would obviously
help reduce the overhead. But for this chapter, the target is to obtain the
nearest-optimal solution, wherefore we do not consider the simplification.
3.4 Performance Results and Discussions
The main simulation parameters are listed in Table 3.2. As shown in Fig.
3.1, simulations are carried out in a single cell. Both path-loss model and
shadow fading are considered for cellular and D2D links. The wireless prop-
agation is modeled according to WINNER II channel models [19], and D2D
channel is based on office/indoor scenario while cellular channel is based on
the urban microcell scenario.
1) System Sum Rate
The system sum rate with different numbers of D2D pairs and different
numbers of resource units using the proposed auction algorithm is illustrated
in Fig. 3.2 ∼ Fig. 3.4. The sum rate can be obtained from (3.9).
From Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.4, we can see that the system sum rate goes
up with both the number of D2D pairs and the number of resource units
increasing. On one side, when the amount of resources is fixed, more D2D
users contribute to a higher system sum rate. On the other side, as the
amount of resource increases, the probability of resources with less interfer-
ence to D2D links being assigned to them enhances, which can lead to the
increased sum rate. This phenomenon is similar to the effect of multiuser
diversity. Definitely, cellular users also contributes to the performance.
From another perspective, Fig. 3.2 ∼ Fig. 3.4 shows the system sum rate
for different allocation algorithms. The curve marked exhaustive optimal is
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simulated by the exhaustive search way, which guarantees a top bound of
the system sum rate. The curve marked reduced R-I-CA is the result of a
reduced reverse I-CA scheme, in which the number of D2D pairs sharing
the same cellular resources is constrained to one. The curve marked R-I-
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Figure 3.2: System sum rate for different allocation algorithms in the case
of 8 resource units.
CA represents the performance of the proposed reverse I-CA algorithm, and
the last one is the simulation result using random allocation of spectrum re-
sources. Firstly, we can see that the proposed auction algorithm is relatively
much superior to the random allocation. Secondly, the optimal allocation
results in the highest system sum rate, but the superiority compared to R-
I-CA is quite small, especially when the number of cellular resource units
increases as Fig. 3.4 shows. Moreover, we find that the performance of re-
duced R-I-CA approximates to that of R-I-CA scheme in case of 8 resource
units, but differs obviously in case of 2 resource units shown in Fig. 3.3.
The reason for this phenomenon is that the constraint of the reduced R-I-
CA limits D2D pairs accessing to the network when the number of resources
units is less than that of D2D pairs, thus a large capacity loss products.
2) System Efficiency
We define the system efficiency as η = ℜ/ℜopt, where ℜopt represents
the exhaustive optimal sum rate. Fig. 3.5 shows the system efficiency with
different numbers of D2D pairs and different numbers of resource units. The
simulation result indicates that the proposed algorithm provides high (the
lowest value of η is around 0.7) system efficiency. Moreover, the efficiency
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Figure 3.3: System sum rate for different allocation algorithms in the case
of 2 resource units.
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Figure 3.4: System sum rate for different allocation algorithms in the case
of 4 D2D pairs.
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Figure 3.5: System efficiency: η with different numbers of D2D pairs and
different numbers of resource units.
is stable over different parameters of users and resources.
As to the point of efficiency value being about 0.7, the number of resource
units and the number of D2D pairs are both small. The linear price rule
limits bidders to bid the maximal valuation packages, but to bid the pack-
ages having maximal average unit valuation. For this reason, the efficiency
decreases slightly.
As to other points, the efficiency is stable above 0.9, which reflects a small
performance gap between the proposed algorithm and the exhaustive search
scheme. In fact, the descending price rule determines the bidder that has the
highest bid on current items would win the corresponding package, which
maximizes the current overall gain. However, the gap cannot be avoided as
the algorithm essentially follows a local, or an approximate global optimum
principle.
3) Price Monotonicity
Fig. 3.6 shows an example of the price non-monotonicity in the reverse
I-CA scheme. The four curves represent unit price of four D2D pairs. As
the enlarged detail shows, the unit price of D2D pair 2 has an ascending
process during the auction. As the step δ is much less than descending step
∆, the phenomenon of ascending price is hard to pick out. When the items
have been sold out, their prices are fixed to the selling value. And from the
figure, we can find that the D2D pair 2 is the last one to be sold.
In this chapter, we have investigated how to reduce the effects of in-
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Figure 3.6: Price monotonicity: an example of price non-monotonicity in
the reverse I-CA scheme.
terference between D2D and cellular users, in order to improve the system
sum rate for a D2D underlay network. We have proposed the reverse it-
erative combinatorial auction as the mechanism to allocate the spectrum
resources for D2D communications with multiple user pairs. We have for-
mulated the valuation of each D2D pair for each resource unit, and then
explained a detailed auction algorithm depending on the utility function.
A non-monotonic descending price iteration process has been modeled and
analyzed to be cheat-proof, converge in a finite number of rounds, and has
low complexity. The simulation results show that the system sum rate goes
up with both the number of D2D pairs and the number of resource units
increasing. The proposed auction algorithm is much superior to the random
allocation, and provides high system efficiency, which is stable over different
parameters of users and resources.
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Chapter 4
Cross-layer Optimization
D2D communication as an underlay to cellular networks brings significant
benefits to system throughput and energy efficiency. However, as D2D UEs
can cause interference to cellular UEs, the scheduling and allocation of chan-
nel resources and power to D2D communication need elaborate coordination.
Thus, cross-layer optimization is considered in this chapter. In Section 4.1,
both system throughput and fairness are taken into account. A joint time-
domain scheduling and spectrum allocation scheme is studied. Based on the
concept of UE’s battery lifetime, we propose an auction-based algorithm for
power and channel resource allocation of D2D communication in Section 4.2.
4.1 Time-Domain Scheduling
In this section, we propose a joint scheduling and resource allocation scheme
to improve the performance of D2D communication. We take network
throughput and UEs’ fairness into account by performing interference man-
agement. Specifically, we develop a Stackelberg game framework in which
we group a cellular UE and a D2D UE to form a leader-follower pair. The
cellular user is the leader, and the D2D UE is the follower who buys channel
resources from the leader. We analyze the equilibrium of the game, and
propose an algorithm for joint scheduling and resource allocation. Finally,
we perform computer simulations to study the performance of the proposed
algorithm.
4.1.1 Model Assumptions
We still consider a single cell scenario with multiple UEs and one eNB located
at the center of the cell. Both the UEs and the eNB are equipped with a
single omni-directional antenna. The system includes two types of UEs,
D2D UEs and cellular UEs. The D2D UEs are in pairs, each consisting of
one transmitter and one receiver. We consider a dense D2D environment,
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Figure 4.1: System model of D2D underlay communication with uplink
resource sharing. UE1 is a cellular user whereas UE2 and UE3, UE4 and
UE5 are D2D UEs.
where the number of cellular UEs and D2D UEs is K and D (D > K),
respectively. The set of cellular UEs and D2D pairs is K and D, respectively.
There are K orthogonal channels, which is occupied by the corresponding
cellular UEs. The channels allocated to the cellular UEs are fixed, and D2D
communications share the channels with cellular UEs. One channel is only
allowed to be used by one cellular UE and one D2D UE. In LTE, scheduling
takes place every transmission time interval (TTI) [36], which consists of
two time slots. Channels are allocated among D2D UEs according to their
priority. During each TTI,K D2D pairs are selected to share theK channels
with the cellular UEs while other D2D UEs wait for transmission.
A scenario of uplink resource sharing is illustrated in Fig. 4.1, which
includes one cellular UE (UE1) and two D2D pairs (UE2 and UE3, UE4 and
UE5). UE2 and UE4 are transmitters while UE3 and UE5 are receivers. The
two D2D UEs in a pair are close enough to satisfy the maximum distance
constraint of D2D communication, in order to guarantee the quality of D2D
services. D2D pair 1 is selected to share the channel resource with UE1
whereas D2D pair 2 cannot transmit. During the uplink period of the cellular
network, UE1 transmits data to the eNB, while the eNB suffers interference
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from UE2. Also, the D2D pair 1 is in communication while UE3 are exposed
to interference from UE1.
During the downlink period, the cellular UE receives data from the eNB
and interference from D2D transmitter sharing the same channel. The D2D
receivers suffer interference from the eNB. The transmit power of eNB is too
large, causing serious interference to the D2D UEs, so it is hard to guarantee
the quality of D2D services. Therefore, we focus on the uplink frame of the
network.
We define a set of binary variables {xik}(i ∈ D, k ∈ K) to denote the
current D2D pair in communication. xik = 1 if the i-th D2D pair is selected
to use channel k; and xik = 0 otherwise. Based on the analysis above, during
the uplink period, the k-th cellular UE transmits sk to the eNB, and the i-th
D2D transmitter transmits si. The received signals at the eNB and D2D
receiver i are written as
yck =
√
pkgkesk +
D∑
i=1
xik
√
pigiesi + nk, (4.1)
ydi =
√
pigiisi +
K∑
k=1
xik
√
pkgkisk + ni, (4.2)
where pk and pi is the transmit power of the k-th cellular UE and the i-th
D2D transmitter, respectively. gki denotes the channel gain between the
k-th cellular UE and the i-th D2D receiver. gii denotes the channel gain
between the i-th D2D transmitter and the i-th D2D receiver, which are in
a pair. gke is the channel gain between cellular UE k and the eNB, and gie
is the channel gain between D2D transmitter i and the eNB. nk and ni is
the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Without loss of generality, we
assume all UEs observe the same noise power N0.
The received SINR at the i-th D2D receiver can be expressed as
γdi =
pigii∑
k xikpkgki +N0
, (4.3)
The SINR at the eNB corresponding to cellular UE k is
γck =
pkgke∑
i xikpigie +N0
. (4.4)
The channel rate of UEs is obtained by
r = log2(1 + γ). (4.5)
4.1.2 Stackelberg Game
As D2D communication takes place underlaying the primary cellular net-
work, we focus on the power control and scheduling of the D2D UEs, while
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the transmit power and channel of the cellular UE are assumed to be fixed.
D2D communication can utilize the proximity between UEs to improve the
throughput performance of the system. In the meanwhile, the interference
from D2D network to the cellular network should be limited. Thus, the
transmit power of the D2D UEs should be properly controlled. Another
goal is to guarantee the fairness among D2D UEs when scheduling.
Interactions among the selfish cellular and D2D UEs sharing a channel
can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory frame-
work. When the players choose their strategies independently without any
coordination, it usually leads to an inefficient outcome. If we simply model
the D2D scenario as a noncooperative game, D2D UEs will choose to use the
maximum transmit power to maximize their own payoffs regardless of other
players, whereas cellular UEs will choose not to share the channel resources
with D2D UEs. This is an inefficient outcome, as the interference is too
serious or D2D cannot get access into the network.
Therefore, we employ the Stackelberg game to coordinate the scheduling,
in which the cellular UEs are the leaders and the D2D UEs are the followers.
We focus on the behavior of a one-leader one-follower pair. The leader owns
the channel resource and it can charge the D2D UE some fees for using the
channels. The fees are fictitious money to coordinate the system. Thus, the
cellular UE has an incentive to share the channel with the D2D UE if it is
profitable, and the leader has the right to decide the price. For the D2D
UE, under the charging price, it can choose the optimal power to maximize
its payoff. In this way, an equilibrium can be reached.
1) Utility Functions
We analyze the behavior of a one-leader one-follower pair, which includes
cellular UE k as the leader, and D2D pair i as the follower. The utility of
the leader can be defined as its own throughput performance plus the gain it
earns from the follower. The fee should be decided according to the leader’s
own consideration. Thus, we set the fee proportional to the interference the
leader observe. The utility function of the leader can be expressed as
uk(αk, pi) = log2
(
1 +
pkgke
pigie +N0
)
+ αkβpigie, (4.6)
where αk is the charging price (αk > 0). β is a scale factor to denote
the ratio of the leader’s gain and the follower’s payment (β > 0). β is a
key parameter to influence the outcome of the game, which we will discuss
later. The optimization problem for the leader is to set a charging price that
maximizes its utility, i.e.,
max uk(αk, pi), s.t. αk > 0. (4.7)
For the follower, the utility is its throughput performance minus the cost
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it pays for using the channel, which can be expressed as
ui(αk, pi) = log2
(
1 +
pigii
pkgki +N0
)
− αkpigie. (4.8)
The optimization problem for the follower is to set proper transmit power
to maximize its utility, i.e.,
max ui(αk, pi), s.t. pmin ≤ pi ≤ pmax. (4.9)
In the Stackelberg game, the leader moves first and the follower moves
sequentially, i.e., the leader sets the price first, and the follower selects its
best transmit power based on the price. The leader knows ex ante that the
follower observes its action. The game can be solved by backward induction.
2) Follower Analysis
Given αk decided by the leader, when pi approaches 0, the utility ap-
proaches 0 as well. As pi increases, ui also increases. If pi grows too large, ui
will begin to decrease since the logarithmic function grows slower than the
cost. The follower wants to maximize its utility by choosing proper transmit
power. The best response is derived by solving
∂ui
∂pi
=
1
ln 2
gii
pigii + pkgki +N0
− αkgie = 0. (4.10)
The solution is
pˆi =
1
αkgie ln 2
− pkgki +N0
gii
. (4.11)
The second order derivative is
∂2ui
∂p2i
= − 1
ln 2
(
gii
pigii + pkgki +N0
)2
< 0. (4.12)
Thus, the solution in (4.11) is a maximum point.
From (4.11), we know the power is monotonically decreasing with αk,
which means when the price is higher, the amount of power bought is
smaller. Note that pmin ≤ pi ≤ pmax, thus, the best response is searched in
{pmin, pmax, pˆi}.
3) Leader Analysis
The leader knows ex ante that the follower will react to his price by
searching in {pmin, pmax, pˆi}. If the leader sets the price too low, the follower
will only buy pmax, and the leader will earn more if it raises the price.
Besides, the price is restricted to be set too high, to prevent inefficient
outcome. Thus, the leader will set a price such that pmin ≤ pˆi ≤ pmax.
Solving the inequations, we have
αkmin =
gii
(giipmax + pkgki +N0)gie ln 2
, (4.13)
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αkmax =
gii
(giipmin + pkgki +N0)gie ln 2
, (4.14)
and αkmin ≤ α ≤ αkmax.
Substituting the follower’s strategy (4.11) into the leader’s utility func-
tion, we get
uk(αk) =
β
ln 2
− αkβgie pkgki +N0
gii
+ log2
[
1 + pkgke
(
1
αk ln 2
− gie pkgki +N0
gii
+N0
)−1]
.
(4.15)
There is a tradeoff between the gain from the leader itself and the gain from
the follower. When the leader raises the price, it will gain less from the
follower according to (4.15), but the follower will buy less power, which will
lead to an increase in the leader’s rate. Therefore, there is an optimal price
for the leader to ask for.
Let A = pkgke, B = 1/ln 2, C = −gie(pkgki +N0)/gii +N0, we have
uk(αk) = log2
(
1 +
Aαk
Cαk +B
)
+ (C −N0)βαk +Bβ. (4.16)
To get the optimal price, by taking the first order derivative, we obtain
duk
dαk
=
AB2
(Cαk +B)[(A+ C)αk +B]
+ (C −N0)β. (4.17)
We consider the following cases:
1) C = 0. The first order condition is
duk
dαk
=
AB
Aαk +B
−N0β = 0. (4.18)
The solution is
αˆk =
B
N0β
− B
A
. (4.19)
The second order derivative is
d2uk
dα2k
= −B
(
A
Aαk +B
)2
< 0. (4.20)
Note that αkmin = B/(pmaxgie +N0 − C) and αkmax=B/(pmingie+N0−C).
Thus, the optimal αk is searched in {αˆk, αkmin, αkmax}.
2) A+C = 0. The optimal price αk can be solved similarly. The solution
is searched in {BA − B(A+N0)β , αkmin, αkmax}.
If C 6= 0 and A+C 6= 0, we denote f(αk) = (Cαk +B)[(A+C)αk +B],
which is a quadratic function of αk. We notice that roots for the f(αk) are
αk1 = −BC and αk2 = − BA+C . From αk ≤ αkmax, we get (C−N0)αk+B ≥ 0.
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Thus, Cαk +B > 0 and (A+C)αk +B > 0. We discuss the following three
cases based on the sign of C and A+ C.
3) C > 0. We have αk ≥ αkmin > 0 > αk2 > αk1. f(αk) is monotonically
increasing with αk and f(αk) > 0 for αk > αkmin. Thus, the first order
derivative of the utility u′k(αk) is monotonically decreasing with αk and
it follows lim
αk→∞
u′k(αk) = (C − N0)β < 0. If u′k(αkmin) ≤ 0, it satisfies
that u′k(αk) ≤ 0, αk ∈ [αkmin, αkmax]. Thus, the optimal price is αkmin.
Otherwise, if u′k(αkmin) > 0, there exists a unique point such that u
′
k(αk) =
0. Solving u′k(αk) = 0 gives
αk =
−B(A+ 2C)±√∆
2C(A+ C)
, (4.21)
where ∆ = AB2
[
A+ 4C(A+ C) 1(N0−C)β
]
. The maximum point must be
the larger root or on the boundary of the feasible region of α.
4) C < 0 and A + C > 0. We have αk2 < 0 < αkmin ≤ αk < αk1,
and f(αk) > 0. If min u
′
k(αk) ≤ 0, αk ∈ [αkmin, αkmax], with αk increas-
ing, u′0(αk) is increasing, decreasing, and increasing sequentially. Thus, the
maximum point is either on the maximum boundary of the feasible region,
or is the smaller root of u′k(αk) = 0, i.e.,
αk =
−B(A+ 2C) +√∆
2C(A+ C)
. (4.22)
Otherwise, uk(αk) is increasing with αk, the maximum point is αkmax.
5) A + C < 0. We have 0 < αk < αk1 < αk2, f(αk) > 0 and u
′
k(αk) is
monotonically increasing with αk. Thus, there does not exist an maximum
point within the feasible region. By similar analysis, we derive the optimal
price αk is on the boundary of the feasible region.
Based on the discussion above, the optimal αk can be uniquely decided.
The strategies of the leader and the follower construct a Stackelberg equi-
librium defined below.
Definition 8 A pair of strategies (αk, pi) is a Stackelberg equilibrium if no
unilateral deviation in strategy by the leader or the follower is profitable, i.e.,
ui(αk, pi) ≥ ui(αk, p′i), (4.23)
uk(αk, pi(αk)) ≥ uk(α′k, pi(α′k)). (4.24)
The equilibrium is a stable outcome of the Stackelberg game where the
leader and the follower compete through self-optimization and reach a point
where no player wishes to deviate. The analysis of the leader and the follower
above shows the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium.
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Joint D2D Scheduling and Resource Allocation Algorithm
1: Given CSI, TTI t, the scale factor β, the fairness coefficient δ, and the additional
cost ci(t), ∀i.
2: Initialize xik = 0, ∀i, k.
3: Search the optimal α∗ik, ∀i, k in{
B
pmaxgie +N0 − C ,
B
pmingie +N0 − C ,
}
and {
B
N0β
− B
A
,
B
A
− B
(A+N0)β
,
−B(A+ 2C) +√∆
2C(A+ C)
}
.
4: Calculate the optimal power
p∗ik =
1
α∗ikgie ln 2
− pkgki +N0
gii
, ∀i, k.
5: Calculate priorities
Pik = log2
(
1 +
p∗ikgii
pkgki +N0
)
− α∗ikgiep∗ik − ci(t), ∀i, k.
6: Sort Pik in descending order to form a priority queue.
7: while
∑
i xik = 0, ∃k do
8: Select the head of the queue. The pair is(i∗, k∗).
9: if
∑
i xik∗ = 0 and
∑
k xi∗k = 0 then
10: Schedule the pair (i∗, k∗).
11: Set xi∗k∗ = 1 and ci∗(t+ 1) = ci∗(t) + δui∗k∗ .
12: end if
13: Delete the head of the queue.
14: end while
Algorthm 1. Joint scheduling and resource allocation algorithm.
4.1.3 Joint Scheduling and Resource Allocation
The scheduling process is conducted at each TTI. The D2D UEs form a
priority queue for each channel. During each TTI, the eNB selects K D2D
UEs with the highest priority for each channel sequentially and other D2D
UEs have to wait.
In our Stackelberg game framework, the priority is based on the utilities
of the followers, which express the satisfaction of the followers. In the de-
sign of scheduling scheme, fairness is considered as an important goal. The
scheme should take the outcome in the previous TTIs into account. This can
be achieved by adjusting prices for using the channel. The follower has to
pay an additional fee for using the channel at TTI t if it has been selected in
previous TTIs, which will lead to a decrease in the priority. The additional
fee is decided by the cumulative utility of follower. The priority for follower
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i at TTI t can be defined as
Pik(t) = ui(α
∗
k(t), p
∗
i (t))− ci(t), (4.25)
where α∗k(t) and p
∗
i (t) are the optimal strategy pair under the Stackelberg
equilibrium at TTI t. ci(t) is the additional cost, and can be defined as
ci(t) =
t−1∑
τ=0
K∑
k=1
δxik(τ)ui(α
∗
k(τ), p
∗
i (τ)), (4.26)
where δ > 0 is the fairness coefficient. For a larger δ, the cumulative utility
has a larger influence on the priority. If δ = 0, the scheduling scheme does
not take fairness into account.
Based on the above discussion, during each TTI, every cellular UE and
D2D UE form a leader-follower pair and play the Stackelberg game. The
optimal price and power can be decided for each pair. The priority for
each pair can be calculated and they form a priority queue. Then, the
eNB schedules the D2D pairs sequentially according to their order in the
queue. If there is a tie, that one channel has been allocated to another D2D
pair, or the D2D pair has been scheduled to another channel, the pair is
skipped. When each channel is allocated to one D2D pair, the eNB record
the outcome and the scheduling is over. The algorithm is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
The algorithm has a low complexity, as the optimal strategy for each
leader-follower pair is searched in a set with a constant number of elements.
To form the priority queue with length K ×D, the complexity is O(KD).
To evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, we perform sev-
eral simulations. We consider a single circular cell environment. The cellular
UEs and D2D pairs are uniformly distributed in the cell. The two D2D UEs
in a D2D pair are close enough to satisfy the maximum distance constraint of
D2D communication. The received signal power is Pi = Pjd
−2
ij |hij |2, where
Pi and Pj are received power and transmit power, respectively. dij is the dis-
tance between the transmitter and the receiver. hij represents the complex
Gaussian channel coefficient that satisfies hij ∼ CN (0, 1). The scheduling
takes place every TTI. Simulation parameters are summarized in TABLE
4.2.
In Fig. 4.2, we study the effect of the fairness coefficient δ. We plot
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of UE rate. δ has little effect on the
performance of the cellular UEs. For a small δ, D2D UE rate is distributed
in a large range, and has a tendency to converge with a larger δ. Thus,
scheduling with a larger δ achieves better fairness. If we set δ too large, the
scheduling algorithm behaves like the Round Robin scheduling, in which the
previous utility is the deciding factor and the utility of the current TTI has
little influence. If D2D scheduling is not considered, there will be only C
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Table 4.1: Simulation Parameters and Values
Parameter Values
Cell layout 1 isolated, circular
Cell radius 500m
Number of cellular UEs 5
Number of D2D pairs 10
Max D2D communica-
tion distance
50m
Cellular UE Tx power 23dBm
D2D UE Tx power 0dBm – 23dBm
Thermal noise power
density
-174dBm/Hz
Bandwidth 180kHz
Transmission time inter-
val
1ms
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Figure 4.2: UE rate distribution under different δ.
D2D pairs that can get access to the network, resulting in 1−C/D proportion
of D2D UEs cannot achieve any data transmission.
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Figure 4.3: UE power distribution under different β.
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Figure 4.4: UE rate distribution under different β.
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Figure 4.5: Cellular and D2D average UE rate with different number of
cellular UEs.
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Figure 4.6: System sum rate with different numbers of cellular UEs.
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In Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4, we plot CDF of UE transmit power and UE rate
under different scale factor β, respectively. β is the ratio of the leader’s gain
and the follower’s payment. For a larger β, the payment for the follower
is relatively lower, and thus, the follower will choose larger transmit power.
This is illustrated in Fig. 4.3. With larger transmit power of D2D UEs,
the rate of D2D UEs is larger. In the meanwhile, D2D UEs cause more
interference to cellular UEs, causing a decrease in the rate of cellular UEs.
This effect is illustrated in Fig. 4.4. We can also observe that D2D UEs use
a much smaller transmit power than the cellular UEs.
In Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6, we plot average rate of UEs and system sum
rate with different numbers of cellular UEs, respectively. Fig. 4.5 shows
that when the number of cellular UEs increases, the rate performance of
D2D UEs is improved. This is due to the fact that D2D UEs has more
resources to use. We observe that when C = 10, the rate performance of
D2D UEs is much better than that of cellular UEs. The effect of scale factor
β and fairness coefficient δ is shown clearly in the two figures. It can be seen
that the interference is properly managed and the cellular UEs achieve a
reasonable rate performance. Besides, as there are C resources and D D2D
UEs, the average transmission time of D2D UEs is D/C of that of cellular
UEs. In Fig. 4.5, we observe that D2D UEs achieve a similar or higher rate
with cellular UEs. The D2D communication obviously has higher efficiency.
In this section, we developed a Stackelberg game framework for joint
power control, channel allocation and scheduling of D2D communication.
We analyzed the optimal strategy for the constructed game, and proposed
an algorithm to allocate resources and schedule D2D UEs. Throughput,
interference management and fairness of the system were considered. Simu-
lation results show that the proposed algorithm can achieve a good through-
put performance for both the cellular and the D2D UEs. The D2D UEs can
be fairly served. The scale factor β and fairness coefficient δ have an impor-
tant effect on the performance of the algorithm. It is also shown that D2D
communication can improve the throughput of the system.
4.2 Energy Efficient Improvement
Device-to-device (D2D) communication as an underlay to cellular networks
brings significant benefits to users’ throughput and battery lifetime. The
allocation of power and channel resources to D2D communication needs
elaborate coordination, as D2D user equipments (UEs) cause interference to
other UEs. In this section, we propose a novel resource allocation scheme to
improve the performance of D2D communication. Battery lifetime is explic-
itly considered as our optimization goal. We first formulate the allocation
problem as a non-cooperative resource allocation game in which D2D UEs
are viewed as players competing for channel resources. Then, we add pricing
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data signal
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Figure 4.7: System model of D2D underlay communication with uplink
resource sharing. UE1 is a cellular user whereas UE2 and UE3, UE4 and
UE5 are in D2D communication.
to the game in order to improve the efficacy, and propose an efficient auction
algorithm. We also perform simulations to prove efficacy of the proposed
algorithm.
4.2.1 Model Assumptions and Battery lifetime
We also consider a single cell environment with multiple UEs and one eNB
located at the center of the cell. Both the eNB and the UEs are equipped
with a single omni-directional antenna. The system consists of two types of
UEs, cellular UEs and D2D UEs. The D2D UEs are in pairs, each including
one transmitter and one receiver. The number of cellular UEs and D2D UEs
is C and D(D < C), respectively. There are C orthogonal channels, which
is occupied by the corresponding cellular UEs. The channels allocated to
cellular UEs are assumed to be fixed. A D2D pair can reuse RBs of one or
multiple cellular users, and multiple D2D pairs can share the same RBs.
D2D communications during the downlink is infeasible [37], and thus,
we focus on the uplink period. A scenario of uplink resource sharing is
illustrated in Figure 4.7 where one cellular UE (UE1) and two D2D pairs
(UE2 and UE3, UE4 and UE5) are sharing the same radio resource. UE2
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and UE4 are transmitters while UE3 and UE5 are receivers. The two D2D
UEs in a pair are close enough to satisfy the maximum distance constraint
of D2D communication, in order to guarantee the quality of D2D services.
The cellular UE (UE1) transmits data to the eNB, while the eNB suffers
interference from D2D transmitters (UE2 and UE4). Also, the D2D pairs are
in communication while the receivers (UE3, UE5) are exposed to interference
from the cellular user (UE1) and the other D2D transmitters (UE4, UE2,
respectively).
The SINR at the i-th D2D receiver’s on channel c can be expressed as
γci =
pcigii
pc0gci +
∑
j 6=i p
c
jgji +N0
, (4.27)
where pc0 and p
c
j is the transmit power of the c-th cellular UE and the j-th
D2D transmitter on channel c, respectively. gci denotes the channel gain
between the c-th cellular UE and i-th D2D receiver. gji denotes the channel
gain between the j-th D2D transmitter and the i-th D2D receiver. N0 is the
noise power. Note that if pci = 0,∃i, c, it means D2D pair i does not reuse
the resources of the c-th channel. The channel rate of the D2D pair i on the
c-th channel is
rci = log2(1 + γ
c
i ). (4.28)
In this section, the battery lifetime is considered as our optimization
objective. We focus on the scheduling of D2D communication while the
cellular network works in a standard way. The transmit power of cellular
users is assumed to be fixed. We want to extend the battery lifetime while
achieving a reasonable target rate for every D2D pair.
The energy consumption of D2D users includes two parts, the transmis-
sion energy and circuit energy. The circuit energy consumption cannot be
ignored since it has an important effect on the battery lifetime. It is the
energy consumed by all the circuit blocks along the signal path [38]. We
define Pc as the total power consumption of these circuit blocks. Without
loss of generality, we assume all D2D UEs have the same constant circuit
power consumption. Thus, we focus on D2D transmitters. Each D2D trans-
mitter can distribute its transmit power into C channels. The total power
consumption of the i-th D2D transmitter is Pi =
∑C
c=1 p
c
i + Pc. According
to Peukert’s law [31], the battery lifetime L can be approximated by
L =
Q
Ib
, (4.29)
where Q is the battery capacity. I is the discharge current. b is a constant
around 1.3. We denote the average power consumption of the i-th D2D
transmitter by E[Pi]. With an operating voltage V0, the battery lifetime Li
of D2D transmitter i is
Li =
Q
(E[Pi]/V0)b
. (4.30)
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Each D2D pair requires rate R. Our objective is to maximize the total
battery lifetime under the rate constraints, which can be expressed as
max
D∑
i=1
Li, s.t.
C∑
c=1
rci ≥ R,∀i; pci ≥ 0,∀i, c. (4.31)
Since power is an increasing function of rate, lifetime is maximized when∑C
c=1 r
c
i = R. The problem in (4.31) is complicated to solve and hard for
distributed implementation. Therefore, we develop an alternative game-
theoretic approach.
4.2.2 Resource Allocation Game
Consider D2D transmitters as players. The players are self-interested and
each player wants to maximize its own battery lifetime. In order to achieve
this, the best strategy for each player is to minimize its own transmit power
at any given time, regardless of other players. Define power vector pi =
(p1i , p
2
i , ..., p
C
i ) as the transmit power of D2D transmitter i on each channel,
which is also seen as player i’s strategy. The utility function ui can be defined
as the negative of the total transmit power of the i-th D2D transmitter, i.e.,
ui(pi,p−i) = −
C∑
c=1
pci , (4.32)
where p−i is the strategy of other players. By taking proper strategy pi,
each user wants to maximize its utility. We begin by characterizing the best
response for any player i. Define x+ = max(x, 0),x+ = (x+1 , x
+
2 , ..., x
+
n ),qi =
g−1ii (p0gci +
∑
j 6=i pjgji +N0). We assume q
1
i ≤ q2i ≤ · · · ≤ qCi . It is obvious
that qci ≥ 0,∀c.
Proposition 4 Given other players’ strategies, the best response of player
i, i.e., the strategy that maximizes its utility is
p∗i =

(2R k∏
c=1
qci
)1/k
− qi


+
, (4.33)
where k = argmink
∑k
c=1 p
c
i , k ∈ {1, 2, ..., C}.
Proof 4 Consider the Lagrangian
L(λ,pi) = −
C∑
c=1
pci + λ
(
C∑
c=1
rci −R
)
, (4.34)
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where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Solving the Kuhn-Tucker condition ∂L∂pc
i
=
0,∀c and considering pci ≥ 0,∀c, we obtain
pci =
(
λ
ln 2
− qci
)+
,∀c. (4.35)
From the Kuhn-Tucker condition, we know λ ≥ 0. Let us assume 0 ≤
q0i ≤ · · · ≤ qki ≤ λ ≤ qk+1i ≤ · · · ≤ qCi , 1 ≤ k ≤ C. Considering the rate
constraint, we derive
λ = ln 2
(
2R
k∏
c=1
qci
)1/k
. (4.36)
Substituting (4.36) into (4.35), we get (4.33). There are C solutions for k,
and thus, we get C strategies. To maximize the utility function, k is searched
in {1, 2, ..., C}.
From the proof, we know that given other players’ strategies, the best
response of player i is to allocate its transmit power into the k channels with
the best channel qualities. Here, the channel quality refers to qci , since the
SINR of player i on channel c is given by γci = p
c
i/q
c
i , and for lower q
c
i , the
channel quality is better. k is determined by the channel qualities.
Definition 9 A set of strategies p for each player is a Nash equilibrium if
no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player is profitable for that
player, i.e.,
ui(pi,p−i) ≥ ui(p′i,p−i),∀i. (4.37)
The Nash equilibrium offers a stable outcome of a game where multi-
ple players with conflicting interests compete through self-optimization and
reach a point where no player wishes to deviate.
Proposition 5 A Nash equilibrium exists in the proposed game.
Proof 5 A Nash equilibrium exists [39], if ∀i
1. the set of strategies is a nonempty compact convex subset of a Eu-
clidean space;
2. the utility function is continuous and quasi-concave.
Since rate is a log-increasing function of transmit power p, to achieve
a rate target R, player i has an upper bound of its transmit power pci ≤
pmax,∀c. The set of player i’s strategies is Pi = {pi|0 ≤ pci ≤ pmax,∀c},
which is nonempty compact convex subset of Euclidean space RC . For any
two strategies pi,p
′
i ∈ Pi, we have θpi+(1− θ)p′i ∈ Pi,∀θ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, Pi
is a convex set. ui is obviously continuous. Besides, we have ui(θpi + (1 −
θ)p′i) = −
∑C
c=1[θp
c
i + (1 − θ)p′ci ] ≥ min
(
ui(pi), ui(p
′
i)
)
,∀pi,p′i ∈ Pi,∀θ ∈
[0, 1]. Thus, ui is quasi-concave.
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The proposition establishes the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the
game, which guarantees the feasibility of the resource allocation game. We
are also concerned about the efficiency of the game.
Definition 10 A strategy pˆ is Pareto optimal (efficient) if there exists no
other strategy p such that ui(pˆ) ≥ ui(p) for all i and ui(pˆ) > ui(p) for some
i.
Proposition 6 Pareto optimal pˆ of the resource allocation game must be a
Nash equilibrium, i.e., pˆ = p∗.
Proof 6 We prove the proposition by contradiction. Assume pˆi 6= p∗i ,∃i.
Since the utility function ui(pi,p−i) = −
∑
c p
c
i is maximized when pi = p
∗
i
given p−i, there exists ℓ such that pˆ
ℓ
i > p
∗ℓ
i . Thus, if player i sets p
′ℓ
i = p
∗ℓ
i
and keeps other components unchanged, player i will get larger utility u′i >
uˆi. Moreover, For all j 6= i, we have q′ℓj < qˆℓj and r′ℓj = log2(1+p′ℓj /q′ℓj ) > rˆℓj .
Thus,
∑
c r
′c
j > R, which indicates the other players’ rate constraints are not
violated. We still have u′j = uˆj,∀j 6= i. This is a contradiction with that pˆ
is Pareto optimal. Therefore, we have pˆi = p
∗
i .
The game constructed above is a general case. In practical scenarios,
there may be resource sharing constraints of D2D communication. We ad-
dress different resource sharing modes based on the following criteria:
1. Multiple D2D pairs sharing the same channel;
2. one D2D pair reusing multiple channels.
For the first criterion, if one channel is only allowed to be reused by no
more than one D2D pair, D2D UEs do not receive interference from other
D2D UEs. Player i’s strategies will be constrained to allocating power to
channels that satisfies pcj = 0,∀j 6= i. The channel qualities are better due to
less interference. However, it has the disadvantage of low spectrum efficiency
because of the low frequency reuse.
For the second criterion, if one D2D pair is only allowed to reuse one of
the C channels, player i will always choose to reuse the channel of the best
quality, i.e., with the lowest qci , as analyzed above. Thus, the best response
for player i is pci = q
c
i (2
R − 1), c = argmin qci and pci = 0 for other c.
4.2.3 Resource Auction Algorithm
In the above game, each player competes to maximize its own utility by
adjusting transmit power on each channel. However, it ignores the cost it
imposes on the cellular UEs and other D2D UEs by causing interference to
them. In other words, the behavior of the players has an externality for the
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Algorithm 1. Resource Auction Algorithm
1: Set β, R; Pi,j ← 0, ∀i, j; mc ← 0, ∀c; ni ← 0, ∀i;
2: while ni = 0, ∃i do
3: for i = 1 to D do
4: if ni = 1 then
5: pci ← qci (2R − 1), ∀c;
6: else
7: Evaluate all channels as its (ni + 1)-th channel;
8: end if
9: uci ← pci + β(mc + ni), ∀c;
10: if Pi,c 6= 0 then
11: uci ←∞;
12: end if
13: end for
14: (˜i, c˜)← argmaxuci ;
15: if mc˜ 6= 0 or ni˜ 6= 0 then
16: Adjust the power according to (4.39);
17: end if
18: Pi˜,c˜ ← pc˜i˜ ; Pi′,j′ ← p
j′
i′ for adjusted power;
19: mc˜ ← mc˜ + 1, ni˜ ← ni˜ + 1;
20: end while
system. Therefore, we consider pricing for the channel resources, which is
an effective way to deal with externality.
Pricing for the channel resources encourages D2D pairs to reuse the
channels more efficiently. The cost is larger if a D2D pair reuse multiple
channel resources or multiple D2D pairs sharing the same resources. Here,
we consider linear pricing, which is widely used due to its simplicity and
efficiency. We redefine the utility function of player i for channel c as
uci = −pci − β(mc + ni), (4.38)
where β is the unit price, mc denotes the number of players occupying
channel c and ni denotes the number of channels player i reuses. With
pricing, the resource allocation problem can be efficiently solved by auction.
Auction is effective in that the bidding and pricing is a guidance to lead the
player to consider the real payoffs.
Based on (4.38), we design the mechanism of resource allocation auction
which iteratively decides the transmit power. The channels are auctioned
one by one. During the auction, players need to bid for all channels to
compete for resources. In the first round, each player calculates its best
transmit power and corresponding utility. Since this is the first resource for
all players, they will allocate enough power to reach the rate constraint, i.e.,
pci = q
c
i (2
R−1),∀i, c. The player and channel with the highest utility (i, c) =
argmaxuci wins the auction and channel c is sold to player i. Then, the
auction moves to the next round. In this round, player i can compete for a
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second resource. It can distribute its rate into two channels by evaluating all
channels as its second channel. The transmit power is calculated according
to (4.33). c can also be auctioned once more. But the cost of player i for
any resource and the cost of any player for channel c is increased. Besides,
the utility of player i for c is set to infinity, to prevent the resource from
being sold to the same player twice. If c is sold to another player j, player
i needs to readjust its transmit power. In general cases, if multiple players
share the same channel c, and a new player comes in, the transmit power is
adjusted in order to keep the former players’ rate on channel c unchanged,
which can be obtained by solving the linear equations
gii
2r
c
i − 1p
c
i −
∑
j 6=i
gjip
c
j − pc0gci −N0 = 0,∀i sharing c. (4.39)
rci is the original rate for the former players, or the target rate for the
newcomer. Similarly, if player i obtains another channel, all players adjust
the power on c. The auction repeats the above steps until all the players
get at least one channel. The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, we perform sev-
eral simulations. We consider a single circular cell environment. The cellu-
lar UEs and D2D pairs are uniformly distributed in the cell. The maximum
distance constraint of D2D communication is satisfied. The received signal
power is Pi = Pjd
−2
ij |hij |2, where Pi and Pj are received power and transmit
power, respectively. dij is the distance between the transmitter and the re-
ceiver. hij represents the complex Gaussian channel coefficient that satisfies
hij ∼ CN (0, 1). Simulation parameters are summarized in TABLE 4.2.
We plot average D2D battery lifetime and cellular rate under different
conditions. In each figure, we compare our algorithm with random allo-
cation, which allocates resources to D2D pairs randomly, and centralized
allocation, which maximizes the overall lifetime rather than the individu-
als. The figures show that our algorithm performs close to the centralized
scheme and is much superior to random allocation.
In Fig. 4.8 and Fig. 4.9, we plot the effect of rate constraints. In Fig.
4.8, average D2D battery lifetime goes down with higher rate constraints.
This also causes more interference to the cellular network, resulting in the
degrade in cellular rate, which is shown in Fig. 4.9. It is also important to
note that without D2D communication, the average rate of cellular UE is
about 5.8bps/Hz. The average battery lifetime of cellular UEs under such a
rate is Lc = Q/((p0+Pc)/V0)
b = 0.8/(0.35/4)1.3 ≈ 9h. From Fig. 4.8, we can
see that to reach a rate constraint of 6bps/Hz, the average battery lifetime
of D2D UEs is approximately 63h, which is about 7 times of the battery
lifetime of cellular UEs. D2D communication fully utilizes the proximity
between D2D UEs, and thus greatly extends battery lifetime.
Fig. 4.10 and Fig. 4.11 show the influence of maximum D2D commu-
nication distances. In D2D underlaying cellular networks, the maximum
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Table 4.2: Simulation Parameters and Values
Parameter Values
Cell radius 350m
Number of cellular UEs 8
Number of D2D pairs 3
Max D2D communica-
tion distance
30m
Cellular UE Tx power 250mW (24dBm)
Thermal Noise power 1e-7W (-40dBm)
Circuit power consump-
tion
100mW (20dBm)
Battery capacity 800mA·h
Battery operating volt-
age
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Figure 4.8: Average D2D battery lifetime with different rate constraints.
communication distance between D2D UEs is a critical parameter. It is a
criterion for the eNB to decide whether to set up a direct link between the
two users or communicate in ordinary cellular mode. Another important
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Figure 4.9: Average cellular rate with different D2D rate constraints.
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Figure 4.10: Average D2D battery lifetime with different maximum D2D
distances.
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Figure 4.11: Average cellular rate with different maximum D2D distances.
aspect is that D2D needs more transmit power for longer distance, result-
ing in shorter battery lifetime as well as causing more interference to the
cellular network. From the figures, we can see that the distance has an im-
portant influence on the battery lifetime and cellular rate. Battery lifetime
and cellular rate goes down quickly with a larger D2D distance.
In this section, we investigated resource allocation for device-to-device
communication underlaying cellular networks, in order to extend UE bat-
tery lifetime. The proposed resource allocation game was analyzed to have
a Nash equilibrium that is Pareto efficient. We added pricing to the game
to deal with externality, and proposed an auction-based resource allocation
algorithm. The simulation results indicate that D2D communication can
greatly extend UE battery lifetime compared with traditional cellular com-
munication. The results also show that the proposed algorithm performs
close to the centralized scheme, and much better than the random alloca-
tion.
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Chapter 5
Summary
In this book, Device-to-Device communication underlaying cellular networks
has been studied. Some physical-layer techniques and cross-layer optimiza-
tion methods on resource management and interference avoidance have been
proposed and discussed. WINNER II channel models [19] has been applied
to be the signal and interference model and simulation results show that
the performance of D2D link is closely related to the distance between D2D
transmitter and receiver and that between interference source and the re-
ceiver. Besides, by power control, D2D SINR has degraded, which will nat-
urally contribute to low interference to cellular communication. A simple
mode selection method of D2D communication has been introduced. Based
on path-loss (PL) mode selection criterion, D2D gives better performance
than traditional cellular system. When D2D pair is farther away from the
BS, a better results can be obtained. Game theory, which offers a wide
variety of analytical tools to study the complex interactions of players and
predict their choices, can be used for power and radio resource management
in D2D communication.
A distributed threshold-based power control scheme has been proposed
to guarantee the feasibility of D2D connection, and at the same time limit
cellular SINR degradation. Power is calculated by D2D transmitter itself,
which makes the operation flexible and convenient, improving the system
efficiency. Furthermore, a joint beamforming and power control scheme that
aims to maximize the system sum rate while guarantees the performance of
both cellular and D2D connections has been given. The BS carries out
beamforming to avoid D2D from excessive interference, and D2D transmit
power is calculated by the BS based on maximizing the system sum rate.
Also, the BS decides whether the calculated D2D transmit power available
according to SINR threshold of cellular and D2D links.
In the following chapters, game theory was applied to solve resource
management problem and cross-layer optimization problem. A reverse iter-
ative combinatorial auction has been formulated as a mechanism to allocate
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the spectrum resources for D2D communications with multiple user pairs
sharing the same channel. In addition, a game theoretic approach has been
developed to implement joint scheduling, power control and channel alloca-
tion for D2D communication. Finally, joint power and spectrum resource
allocation method has been studied under consideration of battery lifetime,
which is an important application of D2D communication on increasing UE’s
energy efficiency. The simulation results show that all these methods have
beneficial effects on improving the system performance.
In fact, there still exist numerous challenging problems such as simpli-
fication of resource allocation algorithms, multi-cell joint optimization of
system performance, multi-hop transmission in D2D communications and
other optimization problems, all of which wait to be investigated in the fu-
ture work. The solutions will bring large improvements on the performance
of D2D underlaying systems, which, indeed plays a good role in the next
generation wireless communication network.
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List of Acronyms
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
LTE Long Term Evolution
LTE-A Long Term Evolution-Advanced
BS Base Station
MS Mobile Station
D2D Device-to-Device
UEs User Equipments
CSI Channel State Information
UL Uplink
DL Downlink
OFPC Open Loop Fraction Power Control
PL Path Loss
CAs Combinatorial Auctions
WDP Winner Determination Problem
I-CAs Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
HARQ Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request
eNB Evolved Node Base Station
SINR Signal to Interference plus Noise Radio
AWGN Additive White Gaussian Noise
PC Power Control
SLNR Signal to Leakage plus Noise Radio
82
BF Beamforming
RBs Resource Blocks
CAP Combinatorial Allocation Problem
Max C/I Maximum Carrier to Interference
PF Proportional Fair
TTI Transmission Time Interval
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
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